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INFORMATION BUNDLING, DISCLOSURE 
TIMING, AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO 
MARKET VALUATIONS 
CHARLES R. KORSMO* 
Abstract: This Article examines strategic disclosure behavior in the context of 
merger announcements. Merger transactions are frequent targets of litigation, 
including both fiduciary duty class actions and statutory appraisal actions. In ei-
ther type of litigation, the fair value of the target company as a going concern is 
at least a part of the measure of damages. In recent years, courts have increas-
ingly looked to market evidence of valuation—including the trading price of the 
target company’s stock prior to the announcement of the merger. This gives 
managers an incentive to minimize this trading price by strategically timing dis-
closures such that negative news is released prior to announcement of a merger 
while positive news is released simultaneously with or following a merger an-
nouncement. In many ways, the disclosure incentives managers face in the mer-
ger context mirror those they face in the securities fraud context. For years, se-
curities fraud plaintiffs have typically been required to prove loss causation by 
using an event study to show a market decline upon corrective disclosure—a 
practice enshrined by the United States Supreme Court in Dura Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc. v. Broudo. Managers can make this task more difficult by bundling 
corrective disclosures with other potentially material news. Combining the cor-
rective disclosure with additional bad news can make it impossible to determine 
what portion of any resulting price drop to ascribe to the corrective disclosure. 
Combining the disclosure with offsetting good news can reduce or eliminate the 
price reaction altogether. These types of strategic disclosure behaviors have im-
portant implications for the design of federal disclosure rules and judicial doc-
trine. To the extent that courts and regulators ascribe legal significance to the 
market’s reaction to information contained in corporate disclosures, those dis-
closures should be required to be made in a way that results in an informative 
market reaction. As such, this Article proposes that the Securities Exchange 
Commission should require several types of litigation-relevant information to be 
disclosed in standalone, unbundled fashion. In addition, this Article suggests re-
finements to judicial doctrine. These refinements are designed to: (1) minimize 
the incentive for managers to employ opportunistic disclosure strategies; and (2) 
preserve the flexibility to employ non-market valuation evidence where market 
evidence has been corrupted or obscured. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As a general rule, judges hate to perform financial valuations. They 
avoid it whenever possible. When faced with the need to calculate the value 
of a company, or of a piece of information relating to a company, judges are 
typically reluctant to attempt the kind of valuation calculations a securities 
analyst or investment professional might perform. Most would prefer to 
defer to the judgment of the market, when possible. 
Although this reluctance is partly due in part to the legendary aversion 
of lawyers (including judges) to mathematics, it also reflects a wise sense of 
judicial modesty.1 Few economic propositions are better established than 
that well-functioning securities markets, on average, perform far better at 
valuation than even the most sophisticated, motivated, and informed indi-
viduals. No doubt the advantages of market judgments are generally even 
greater vis-à-vis law-trained judges operating on information presented to 
them by adversarial litigants motivated by something other than the desire 
to reach an accurate, unbiased valuation. 
Over the past several decades, judicial deference to market valuations 
has become increasingly formalized doctrinally. Perhaps most notably, for 
many years securities fraud plaintiffs have typically been required to prove 
loss causation by using an event study to show a market decline upon cor-
rective disclosure of the alleged fraud—a practice enshrined by the United 
States Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
Broudo.2 Rather than leaving it to a court to determine whether and how 
much a fraud injured investors by distorting the price of a security, plaintiffs 
must show that the market price itself reacted to the alleged fraud. The key 
to successfully doing so is the ability to detect a statistically significant ab-
normal movement in the relevant firm’s stock price and to prove the price 
change was caused by the corrective disclosure rather than some other 
cause.3 
Corporate managers, however, can make securities fraud plaintiffs’ 
task more difficult—if not impossible—by strategic disclosure practices. 
Most obviously, they can “bundle” the corrective disclosure of a fraud to-
gether with other material news. Combining the corrective disclosure with 
additional bad news can make it impossible to determine what portion of 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 788 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Innumerable are the lawyers 
who explain that they picked law over a technical field because they have a ‘math block’ . . . .” 
(quoting DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: STANDARDS, STATISTICS, 
AND RESEARCH METHODS, at v (student ed. 2008))).  
 2 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
 3 See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part I: Technique 
and Corporate Litigation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 141, 143 (2002). 
574 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:571 
any resulting price drop to ascribe to the corrective disclosure. Combining 
the disclosure with offsetting good news can reduce or eliminate the price 
reaction altogether. In either case, the “signal” of the market reaction to the 
revelation of the fraud will be obscured by the “noise” of the bundled in-
formation. This potential tactic for deterring securities fraud suits has been 
recognized in the academic literature4 and subject to a number of empirical 
investigations.5 
The literature is silent, however, with respect to the incentives of man-
agers to engage in strategic disclosure practices surrounding merger transac-
tions. Even in the absence of the threat of litigation, managers would have 
incentives to make an announced merger appear to be as good a deal as pos-
sible for the target stockholders. In part, the managers have a simple reputa-
tional interest in appearing to have secured a good price for the company. 
Further, managers must persuade stockholders that the deal price is attrac-
                                                                                                                           
 4 See, e.g., Allen Ferrell & Atanu Saha, The Loss Causation Requirement for Rule 10b-5 
Causes of Actions: The Implications of Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 63 BUS. LAW. 163 
(2007); James C. Spindler, Why Shareholders Want Their CEOs to Lie More After Dura Pharma-
ceuticals, 95 GEO. L.J. 653 (2007). Of course, these litigation-related incentives to bundle disclo-
sures operate on top of other incentives—some as simple as the desire to bury bad news. See, e.g., 
Mary Brooke Billings et al., On Guidance and Volatility, J. ACCT. & ECON., Nov.–Dec. 2015, at 
161, 161–64, 177–78 (discussing the bundling of earnings forecasts with other announcements); 
Mary Brooke Billings & Matthew C. Cedergren, Strategic Silence, Insider Selling and Litigation 
Risk, 59 J. ACCT. & ECON. 119, 119–20, 140 (2015) (explaining bundling positive earnings guid-
ance with earnings announcements before insider selling); John R. Graham et al., The Economic 
Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting, 40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 10 (2005) (reporting that 
one-third of chief financial officers admit to trying to bundle bad news with other disclosures); 
S.P. Kothari et al., Do Managers Withhold Bad News?, 47 J. ACCT. RSCH. 241, 246 (2009) (dis-
cussing delaying the release of bad news to bury it with subsequent news); Jonathan L. Rogers & 
Andrew Van Buskirk, Bundled Forecasts in Empirical Accounting Research, 55 J. ACCT. & 
ECON. 43, 43 (2013) (examining the bundling of earnings forecasts with other announcements); 
Charles E. Wasley & Joanna Shuang Wu, Why Do Managers Voluntarily Issue Cash Flow Fore-
casts?, 44 J. ACCT. RSCH. 389, 389–92, 426 (2006) (reviewing certain announcements with the bun-
dling of earnings forecasts); Benjamin N. Lansford, Strategic Coordination of Good and Bad News 
Disclosures: The Case of Voluntary Patent Disclosures and Negative Earnings Surprises 1 (July 17, 
2006) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=830705 [https://
perma.cc/Q8DG-CGBX] (discussing the bundling of both good and bad news). 
 5 See, e.g., Barbara A. Bliss et al., Information Bundling and Securities Litigation, 65 J. 
ACCT. & ECON. 61, 61 (2018) (finding that the bundling of both positive and negative news with 
an earnings restatement reduces the incidence of securities fraud litigation and makes courts more 
likely to dismiss claims); Sebastien Gay, Strategic News Bundling and Privacy Breach Disclo-
sures, 3 J. CYBERSEC. 91, 91 (2017) (finding that firms are more likely to release positive news on 
the same day as disclosure of privacy breaches); Michael Furchtgott & Frank Partnoy, Disclosure 
Strategies and Shareholder Litigation Risk: Evidence from Restatements 26–27 (Univ. San Diego 
Sch. L., Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper Series, Research Paper No. 15-186, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2585267 [https://perma.cc/222B-FVZD] (observing that man-
agers were more likely to bundle other information with earnings restatements following Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo).  
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tive in order to secure the statutorily required stockholder approval.6 As a 
result, managers have multiple incentives to have the merger take place at a 
large premium to the prevailing stock price prior to the announcement of 
the deal. 
The possibility of litigation only heightens these incentives. Merger 
transactions are frequent targets of litigation, both fiduciary duty actions 
and statutory appraisal actions. Fiduciary duty actions are generally brought 
as a class, and these actions typically argue that the directors of the target 
company breached their duties of care or loyalty, resulting in a deal price 
that is lower than it otherwise would have been.7 Appraisal is a statutory 
remedy allowing a stockholder to dissent from a merger and seek a judicial 
determination of the “fair value” of their stock.8 To be successful at the end 
of the day, either type of claim requires a finding that the merger price was 
below fair value (though the approach to calculating fair value may be 
somewhat different in the two types of actions). In either type of litigation, 
the fair value of the target company as a going concern is at least a part of 
the measure of damages. Indeed, valuation cannot be avoided in appraisal 
litigation, where the fair value of the petitioner’s stock is the sole merits 
issue.9 
Like securities fraud litigation, merger litigation has seen courts in-
creasingly look to market evidence in addition to—or even in lieu of—
performing their own valuation calculations. This doctrinal trend is most 
pronounced in appraisal. In Delaware, the leading corporate law jurisdiction 
and the venue for the bulk of appraisal activity,10 the courts have responded 
                                                                                                                           
 6 Management’s desire to get stockholder approval is only heightened when the deal will 
trigger—as many do—valuable side-benefits such as change-of-control payments or golden para-
chutes. See Brian Broughman, CEO Side Payments in Mergers and Acquisitions, 2017 BYU L. 
REV. 67, 71 (“[T]he law already requires that any extra benefits—including side payments—
received by senior management in an acquisition be disclosed to shareholders and that the entire 
transaction be subject to both board and shareholder approval.”). 
 7 See generally Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Structure of Stockholder Litigation: 
When Do the Merits Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 829, 855–58 (2014) (discussing class actions alleg-
ing breach of directors’ fiduciary duties in connection with mergers). 
 8 See id. at 859 (“Appraisal allows a stockholder to dissent from a merger and forego the 
merger consideration in favor of filing a judicial proceeding to calculate the ‘fair value’ of the 
stock cancelled in the merger.” (first quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (2013); and then 
quoting 3 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 13.02 (2008 & Supp. 2013) (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 
2016))). 
 9 Id. at 866 (explaining that in appraisal “[t]he only issue at stake is the fair value of the peti-
tioner’s shares, and the sole remedy available is cash”). 
 10 See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public 
Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551, 1553 (2015) (“Appraisal activity involving public 
companies is undergoing explosive growth in Delaware, driven by sophisticated parties who spe-
cialize in bringing appraisal claims.”); Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: 
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to a spike in appraisal activity by increasingly eschewing traditional valua-
tion methodologies (such as a discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis) in fa-
vor of deference to market evidence. 
Traditionally, Delaware courts seek to award appraisal petitioners their 
“proportionate interest in [the] going concern”11—that is, their pro rata share 
of the value of the company as a going concern in the absence of the merger. 
The pre-announcement trading price of the target company’s stock is a natural 
place to start in determining the company’s going-concern value. After all, the 
stock price represents the market’s judgment as to the value of the individual 
fractionalized equity interests—the shares of stock—in the company. And 
indeed, the Delaware courts, although thus far eschewing any general pre-
sumption, have increasingly looked to the pre-announcement trading price of 
the target company as persuasive evidence—or even dispositive evidence—of 
fair value. 12  This litigation dynamic heightens management’s incentive to 
increase the size of the merger premium by pushing down the pre-announce-
ment trading price.  
Management has a wide array of potential tools for managing the pre-
announcement price. Perhaps the simplest, however, is to simply time the 
announcement of the merger with the announcement of quarterly earnings. 
Management generally has ample discretion to time the signing of a merger 
agreement—and thus the accompanying disclosure. Likewise, the timing of 
quarterly earnings announcements is flexible. 
Where the earnings news is negative—that is, where the news likely 
will lower the stock price and increase the merger premium—management 
may prefer to release the earnings news prior to announcing the merger, 
giving the market time to react to the negative news. Where earnings news 
is positive—that is, where it will likely raise the stock price and reduce the 
merger premium—managers may instead choose to either bundle the earn-
ings announcement with the merger announcement, or simply delay the 
earnings announcement until after the merger is announced. Either way, the 
                                                                                                                           
Appraisal’s Role in Corporate Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 10 (1995) (describing Delaware as the “lead-
ing corporate law jurisdiction”). 
 11 Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989) (quoting Tri-Cont’l Corp. 
v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950)). In recent decisions, the Delaware Supreme Court has mud-
died the waters considerably by suggesting a somewhat different approach to defining “fair val-
ue,” namely that dissenters are entitled to “what they deserve to receive based on what would 
fairly be given to them in an arm’s-length transaction.” DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Part-
ners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 370–71 (Del. 2017). Elsewhere, Professor Minor Myers and I have ar-
gued that this approach to fair value is flawed. See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, The 
Flawed Corporate Finance of Dell and DFC Global, 68 EMORY L.J. 221 (2018). The dispute is 
not vital to my argument here and, in any event, trial courts continue to seek to determine the 
going-concern value in appraisal actions. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 12 See discussion infra Part II. 
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market will not have a chance to react to the positive earnings before the 
merger price largely determines the trading price. 
In either case, timing the disclosures makes life more difficult for po-
tential plaintiffs and may deter litigation altogether. In the instance of early 
release of negative news, this is not particularly troubling—it allows the 
market to value the news prior to announcement of the merger. Delayed 
release of positive news, however, is potentially problematic. It ensures that 
the pre-announcement price does not incorporate the value of the positive 
information, and it thus makes the price less informative as to the stand-
alone value of the company at the time. 
In this Article, I extend the existing literature in two ways. First, I ex-
pand the prior literature on disclosure bundling in the securities fraud con-
text to the merger context, analyzing how developments in Delaware doc-
trine have increased the incentive for management to bundle or time disclo-
sures around merger announcements. Much as the early articles on disclosure 
bundling in the securities fraud context triggered numerous empirical studies, 
the analysis here identifies several potential targets for empirical investiga-
tion in the merger context. In particular, researchers should examine wheth-
er negative earnings are more likely to be disclosed prior to a merger an-
nouncement than positive earnings and whether this tendency has shifted in 
response to exogenous changes that make merger-related litigation more or 
less likely. 
Second, earlier work on disclosure bundling was largely content to an-
alyze the phenomenon. Although several authors implicitly suggested that 
Dura’s loss causation rule is sub-optimal and created perverse incentives,13 
they stopped short of specific doctrinal or regulatory prescriptions. In this 
Article, I more fully explore the significant implications of disclosure bun-
dling and timing for the design of disclosure rules and judicial doctrine. 
The guiding principle is straightforward. To the extent courts and regu-
lators ascribe legal significance to market reactions to information con-
tained in corporate disclosures, disclosures should be made in a way that 
results in a more informative market reaction. In particular, it may make 
sense to require that certain types of material information clearly relevant to 
litigation—such as corrective disclosures or merger announcements—be 
made in isolation, rather than bundled with other material disclosures. At a 
minimum, defendants who have obscured market signals via disclosure 
bundling or timing should not be permitted by courts to rely on those mar-
ket signals (or lack thereof) as a defense. These proposals entail amending 
the loss causation rules announced in Dura, as well as refinements of Dela-
                                                                                                                           
 13 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
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ware’s emerging appraisal jurisprudence. These reforms would impose min-
imal burdens on issuers, while enhancing the quality of market information 
available to courts adjudicating securities fraud and merger claims and 
promoting the pricing efficiency of securities markets in general. 
This paper proceeds in five parts. Part I briefly traces the doctrinal de-
velopments whereby courts have increasingly deferred to markets in valua-
tion-related matters.14 Part II introduces the prior literature on strategic dis-
closure bundling in securities fraud cases.15 Part III extends the analysis to 
merger litigation, considering the possible forms of strategic disclosure bun-
dling and timing.16 Part IV suggests potential reforms to disclosure regulation 
to prevent the harmful disclosure practices that Parts II and III canvass.17 Part 
V suggests doctrinal changes and refinements to minimize the incentives for 
strategic disclosure bundling and timing as well as to minimize the mischief 
caused when they occur.18 
I. THE USE OF MARKET REACTIONS IN LITIGATION 
Although market-based evidence is potentially relevant in many types 
of litigation, it is particularly pertinent in securities fraud and merger litiga-
tion, and its use in these contexts has been enshrined in judicial doctrine. As 
such, this Part restricts itself to considering the reliance of courts on market 
evidence in these two contexts.19 Specifically, Section A discusses market-
based evidence in the context of securities fraud litigation,20 and Section B 
examines market-based evidence in the context of merger litigation.21 
A. Securities Fraud Litigation 
The modern securities fraud class action is, as the United States Su-
preme Court noted long ago, “a judicial oak which has grown from little 
more than a legislative acorn.”22 Though rooted in Section 10(b)23 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,24 neither the statute nor the Securities and 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See discussion infra Part I. 
 15 See discussion infra Part II. 
 16 See discussion infra Part III. 
 17 See discussion infra Part IV. 
 18 See discussion infra Part V. 
 19 See discussion infra Part I. 
 20 See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 21 See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 22 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). 
 23 15 U.S.C. § 78j. 
 24 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq). 
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Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Rule 10b-5 implementing the statute create 
an express private cause of action.25 Instead, starting in the 1940s, federal 
courts have recognized and shaped an implied cause of action.26 Both the 
statute and the implementing rule are brief, catch-all provisions barring ma-
nipulation or deceit in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.27 
Given these circumstances, it is perhaps unsurprising that courts have 
taken an essentially common law approach to doctrinal development. 28 
Likewise, it is natural that courts have drawn on analogy to the common 
law tort of fraud in crafting the elements of securities fraud: materiality, 
scienter, reliance, and loss causation.29 The tort analogy invites courts to 
assess a fraudulent statement in a securities fraud case in much the same 
way as in a case involving the sale of ordinary goods, such as a used car. 
That is, the court could assess materiality of a false statement of fact by ask-
                                                                                                                           
 25 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2020); supra notes 23–24. 
 26 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania first recognized a private 
cause of action under Rule 10b-5 in 1946. See Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 
(E.D. Pa. 1946). Five years later, the prominent scholar Louis Loss noted that a private cause of 
action was recognized “in almost two score other cases” and that “[n]o judge has expressed [them-
selves] to the contrary.” LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 1049–50 (1951). The U.S. Su-
preme Court recognized the existence of a private cause of action for securities fraud in 1971, 
without discussion. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 & n.9 
(1971). 
 27 Rule 10b-5 reads, in its entirety:  
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, 
or course of business that operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 28 See, e.g., Charles R. Korsmo, Market Efficiency and Fraud on the Market: The Danger of 
Halliburton, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 827, 832 (2014) (“Unsurprisingly, this parsimonious 
statutory and regulatory framework, covering a vast array of potential activities, has yielded an 
almost common-law style interpretive approach by courts.”); Louis Loss, Commentary, The As-
sault on Securities Act Section 12(2), 105 HARV. L. REV. 908, 910–11 (1992) (noting that, because 
courts have essentially created a new federal tort from Rule 10b-5, “one should not be shocked to 
see them invoking Erie-resistant federal common law in order to invent appropriate qualifications 
of the new tort”). 
 29 See Korsmo, supra note 28, at 833 (“The elements for 10b-5 securities fraud claims were 
derived by analogy to the common law tort of fraud.”); Jeffrey L. Oldham, Comment, Taking 
“Efficient Markets” Out of the Fraud-on-the-Market Doctrine After the Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 995, 1003 (2003) (“Derived primarily from the common law 
of fraud, the basic elements of a Rule 10b-5 cause of action have become materiality, scienter, 
reliance, and loss causation.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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ing whether “its existence or nonexistence is a matter to which a reasonable 
[person] would attach importance in determining [their] choice of action in 
the transaction in question.”30 The court could then assess reliance and cau-
sation by asking whether the plaintiff’s “justifiable reliance upon the mis-
representation [was] a substantial factor in determining the course of con-
duct which result[ed] in [their] loss.”31 “Out-of-pocket” damages could then 
be calculated.32 
In theory, these elements would ask the court to make direct judgments 
as to materiality and reliance. The measure of damages would also require 
the judge to directly calculate the “value” of the fraudulent information. 
Indeed, courts have long defined damages in securities fraud actions as “the 
difference between the price paid and the ‘real’ value of the security, i.e., 
the fair market value absent the misrepresentations, at the time of the initial 
purchase.”33 This would seem to require the court to perform two valua-
tions—the “true value” of the securities and the value of the securities if the 
fraudulent statements were true.34 
In practice, these inquiries are both muddied and simplified by the na-
ture of impersonal public securities markets:  
Such markets differ from more familiar markets for consumer 
goods and services where the common law of fraud developed, in 
that (1) prices are set by impersonal market mechanisms, rather 
than by face-to-face bargaining; and (2) securities are typically 
not being purchased for any form of personal consumption, in-
stead of or in addition to for investment and resale.35  
                                                                                                                           
 30 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (AM. L. INST. 1938). 
 31 Id. § 546. 
 32 See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Reassessing Damages in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 
66 MD. L. REV. 348, 363 (2007) (noting that the “out-of-pocket measure” of damages in securities 
fraud actions “originated in tort law”). 
 33 Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 n.5 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Huddle-
ston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 556 (5th Cir. 1981), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on 
other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983)); see also Burch, supra note 32, at 364 n.78 (collecting cases). 
 34 See Burch, supra note 32, at 364 & n.79 (explaining the notion of “true value” in the con-
text of out-of-pocket damages (first citing Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 260 F.3d 239, 249 
(3d Cir. 2001); and then citing Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class 
Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1490–91 (1996))). 
 35 Korsmo, supra note 28, at 868; see also Burch, supra note 32, at 363–70 (noting the impli-
cations of the “disparities between face-to-face and open-market transactions” for calculating 
damages). Judge Easterbrook made the same general point in pungent fashion in West v. Pruden-
tial Securities, Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2002), noting there is not “an economic market in 
‘Jefferson Savings stock’ as there is in dill pickles or fluffy towels. . . . [I]nvestors do not want 
Jefferson Savings stock (as if they sought to paper their walls with beautiful certificates); they 
want monetary returns (at given risk levels) . . . .” 
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The nature of reliance is somewhat muddied and the distinctions among the 
elements blurred. At the same time, however, questions of materiality, loss 
causation, and damages are potentially simplified by the ability to outsource 
inquiries to the market: Did the market regard the information as material? 
How did the market calculate the value of the misrepresentation? Indeed, an 
influential 1982 article argued “that there is no need in a[n open-market] 
securities fraud case for separate inquiries into materiality, reliance, causa-
tion, and damages”—the only “inquiry in open-market transactions should 
be whether the market price was in fact artificially affected by false infor-
mation.”36 
Although the courts have not fully embraced a move away from the 
traditional elements of deceit in favor of a catch-all “market impact” in-
quiry, they have nonetheless gone a long way in that direction. For each 
element, courts now look largely, if not exclusively, to market impact as 
definitive evidence. First, and most famously, in 1988, the Supreme Court 
in Basic Inc. v. Levinson embraced the “fraud-on-the-market” presumption, 
effectively doing away with the reliance requirement by allowing it to be 
presumed for stocks traded on well-developed markets.37 The Court rea-
soned that investors buying and selling stock “at the price set by the market 
do[] so in reliance on the integrity of that price”38 and that “the market price 
of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly available 
information, and, hence, any material misrepresentations.”39 This approach 
necessarily puts the market impact of allegedly fraudulent statements front 
and center—if the market price was not distorted, the logic of Basic does 
not apply.40 
Market impact has become the key inquiry for the other elements as 
well in the wake of Basic.41 Courts have found market tests attractive be-
                                                                                                                           
 36 Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving 
Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. LAW. 1, 13 (1982); see also Jill E. Fisch et al., The Logic and 
Limits of Event Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 96 TEX. L. REV. 553, 559 (2018) (“Fischel 
argued that the only relevant inquiry in a securities fraud case was the extent to which market 
prices were distorted by fraudulent information—it was unnecessary for the court to make sepa-
rate inquiries into materiality, reliance, causation, and damages.”). 
 37 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988). 
 38 Id. at 247. 
 39 Id. at 246. 
 40 See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 278 (2014) (“In the absence 
of price impact, Basic’s fraud-on-the-market theory and presumption of reliance collapse.”); Fisch 
et al., supra note 36, at 560 (“Price impact is a critical component of [Basic’s] approach because 
absent an impact on stock price, plaintiffs who trade in reliance on the market price are not de-
frauded.”). 
 41 See Fisch et al., supra note 36, at 568 (“[P]roof of price impact is relevant to multiple ele-
ments of securities fraud. A single event study may provide evidence relating to materiality, reli-
ance, loss causation, economic loss, and damages.”). 
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cause “they provide a convenient and reliable market test of all the elements 
of a Rule 10b-5 fraud action: reliance, materiality, causation, and the level 
of damages are evident in market reaction when the corrective information 
hits the market.”42 In Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, the Supreme 
Court held that plaintiffs, in order to show loss causation, needed to show 
not only that the fraudulent information inflated the market price, but also 
that revelation of the truth caused the price to fall, injuring the plaintiffs.43 
In practice, this means that plaintiffs must allege—and ultimately prove—
an impact on market price “both at the time of the misrepresentation and on 
the alleged corrective disclosure date.”44 In the wake of Dura, in 2014, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has noted that “[t]he 
usual—it is fair to say ‘preferred’—method of proving loss causation in a 
securities fraud case is through an event study” showing a statistically sig-
nificant price reaction to a corrective disclosure.45 
Following Basic (and Dura), it is difficult to separate clearly the loss 
causation analysis from the other elements, all of which also turn on market 
impact. For materiality, rather than engage in the tradition abstract consid-
eration of whether a piece of information is likely to be “viewed by the rea-
sonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of infor-
mation made available,”46 courts now typically defer to the market itself. 
Changes in market prices are a direct reflection of what investors consider 
significant. If a fraudulent statement—or the emergence of the truth—has a 
measurable impact on the market price, courts treat it as strong evidence the 
fraudulent statement was material.47 Conversely, the absence of any meas-
urable price reaction is strong evidence of immateriality.48 
                                                                                                                           
 42 Spindler, supra note 4, at 676; see also id. at 664 (noting that a market impact requirement 
“largely automate[s] the trier of fact’s tests of materiality and damages, whereas ‘[j]uries generally 
do not have a clue’ about ex ante valuations of fraudulent information” (second alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting John C. Coffee, Jr., Causation by Presumption? Why the Supreme Court Should 
Reject Phantom Losses and Reverse Broudo, 60 BUS. LAW. 533, 538 (2005))). 
 43 544 U.S. 336, 339–40 (2005). 
 44 Fisch et al., supra note 36, at 561 (footnote omitted). 
 45 Bricklayers & Trowel Trades Int’l Pension Fund v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 752 
F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 46 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. North-
way, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). 
 47 See, e.g., In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997) (“In 
the context of an ‘efficient’ market, the concept of materiality translates into information that 
alters the price of the firm’s stock.”); In re Sadia, S.A. Sec. Litig., 269 F.R.D. 298, 302, 311 & 
n.104, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (relying on evidence of market impact in finding materiality); Fisch et 
al., supra note 36, at 562 (“Event studies can be used to demonstrate the impact of fraudulent 
statements on stock price, providing evidence that the statements are material.”). 
 48 See, e.g., In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 269 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that a 
false disclosure was not material where it had “no negative effect” on the stock price); Oran v. 
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Courts also rely on market impact to establish economic loss and cal-
culate damages. If the plaintiffs are unable to show any impact of the fraud 
on market prices, they will be unable to show they suffered an economic 
loss. Where plaintiffs can show such an impact, the extent of the change in 
market price will generally be the measure of damages. Courts routinely 
reject attempts to establish damages by valuing information directly, rather 
than by conducting an event study to determine market impact.49 
In sum, if plaintiffs are ultimately unable to prove that a fraudulent 
statement had an impact on the market price, their claims will inevitably 
fail. Modern judicial practice requires plaintiffs to tie a price impact to the 
alleged fraud to establish materiality, loss causation, economic loss and 
damages, and even a presumption of reliance.  
B. Merger Litigation 
Market evidence of value also plays an increasingly large role in mer-
ger litigation. Stockholders seeking to challenge a merger transaction have 
two primary options for doing so. The first is the traditional fiduciary duty 
class action, wherein the plaintiffs allege that the officers and/or directors 
breached one or more of their fiduciary duties in the course of entering into 
the merger transaction.50 The second is an appraisal action. Appraisal is a 
statutory action51 allowing a stockholder to dissent from a merger, forgoing 
the merger consideration and instead filing a judicial proceeding to calcu-
late the “fair value” of the dissenter’s stock.52 
                                                                                                                           
Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 282 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[I]n an efficient market ‘the concept of materiality 
translates into information that alters the price of the firm’s stock . . . .’” (quoting Burlington Coat 
Factory, 114 F.3d at 1425)). 
 49 See, e.g., In re Imperial Credit Indus., Inc. Sec. Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1015 (C.D. 
Cal. 2003) (noting that “a number of courts have rejected or refused to admit into evidence dam-
ages reports or testimony by damages experts in securities cases which fail to include event stud-
ies or something similar”), aff’d sub nom. Mortensen v. Snavely, 145 F. App’x 218 (9th Cir. 
2005); In re N. Telecom Ltd. Sec. Litig., 116 F. Supp. 2d 446, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding an 
expert’s testimony “fatally deficient in that he did not perform an event study or similar analy-
sis”); In re Exec. Telecard, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 979 F. Supp. 1021, 1025 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“The relia-
bility of the Expert Witness’[s] proposed testimony is called into question by his failure to indicate 
. . . whether he conducted an ‘event study’ . . . .”). 
 50 See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 7, at 855–58 (tracing the logic and structure of merger 
class actions). 
 51 See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2020); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 13.02 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 52 See generally Korsmo & Myers, supra note 7, at 859–68 (first quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
8, § 262(a) (2013); and then quoting 3 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 13.02 (2008 & Supp. 
2013) (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 2016) (tracing the history and structure of the appraisal reme-
dy). Appraisal rights of some kind have been available in some states since the mid-nineteenth 
century and became widely available in their modern form in the early twentieth century. 
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In both types of action, the fair value of the target company is general-
ly the key variable in determining damages. Although courts in fiduciary 
duty class actions have broad equitable powers to craft appropriate reme-
dies, the starting point is out-of-pocket loss as measured by the difference 
between the “fair value” of the plaintiffs’ shares and the deal price.53 Thus, 
at the damages stage, a fiduciary duty class action becomes largely indistin-
guishable from an appraisal action, where the fair value of the target com-
pany is the only merits issue.54 Indeed, Delaware courts often refer to cash 
damages in a merger class action as a “quasi-appraisal” remedy.55 The ques-
                                                                                                                           
 53 See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983) (describing the notion of 
“fair value,” while noting that “the Chancellor’s powers are complete to fashion any form of equi-
table and monetary relief as may be appropriate” (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) 
(1983))); In re Orchard Enters., Inc. S’holder Litig., 88 A.3d 1, 38–42 (Del. Ch. 2014) (evaluating 
the damages available in a merger class action). Calculation of damages in merger class actions is 
a somewhat theoretical question, as the number of cases proceeding through trial is vanishingly 
small. See STEFAN BOETTRICH & SVETLANA STARYKH, NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT 
TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 2016 FULL-YEAR REVIEW 41 (2017), https://
www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2017/PUB_2016_Securities_Year-End_Trends_
Report_0117.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SSW-R7BE] (“Very few securities class actions reach the 
trial stage and even fewer reach a verdict.”). 
 54 See, e.g., Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713–14 (equating “fair price” in a merger class action 
with “fair value” in appraisal (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1983))); Sterling v. May-
flower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 114 (Del. 1952) (adopting for a fiduciary duty case the valuation 
standard for appraisal); see also Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 845 (Del. 1987) 
(stating that the “fair price” measure in a class action “flow[s] from the statutory provisions per-
mitting mergers and those designed to ensure fair value by an appraisal” (citation omitted)); Poole 
v. N.V. Deli Maatschappij, 243 A.2d 67, 69 (Del. 1968) (affirming the trial court’s conclusion 
that, for damages purposes, “the stock is to be evaluated on a going-concern basis and not on a 
liquidation basis; that the actual or true value of the stock is to be determined by considering the 
various factors . . . deemed relevant in a stock evaluation problem arising under . . . 8 Del. C. 
§ 262”); Del. Open MRI Radiology Assocs., P.A. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290, 342–44 (Del. Ch. 
2006) (determining fair value and using it as the measure of damages in a breach of fiduciary duty 
case); In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at *9 
(Del. Ch. June 4, 2004) (deciding monetary damages after determining fair value). It is worth 
noting that, conceptually, it might make sense to have a different measure of fair value in a fiduci-
ary duty action than in an appraisal action. In particular, in a fiduciary duty action, it would be 
reasonable to award plaintiffs the amount they would have gotten in the merger absent the breach 
of duty. Sometimes—perhaps most of the time—this will be equivalent to fair value as a going 
concern. But sometimes it may be something else, such as the value they would have fairly gotten 
in an unconflicted, arm’s-length transaction, which may be substantially different where there are 
significant synergies. Elsewhere, Professor Myers and I have criticized the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s recent decisions for eliding the differences between the fiduciary duty and appraisal con-
texts. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 11, at 269–73. 
 55 See, e.g., Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714 (using the term “quasi-appraisal” first to describe 
the measure of damages for a breach of fiduciary duty in connection with a merger); In re Ru-
ral/Metro Corp. S’holders Litig., 102 A.3d 205, 224–25 (Del. Ch. 2014) (“The ‘fair value’ or ‘in-
trinsic value’ of the shares held by the class is determined by using the same methodologies em-
ployed in an appraisal, and this form of damages is sometimes colloquially called a ‘quasi-
appraisal’ remedy.” (footnote omitted) (first quoting Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713–14; and then 
 
2021] Strategic Disclosure Behavior 585 
tion of how to define “fair value” in appraisal is thus significant in both 
types of merger litigation. 
Delaware courts have long held that appraisal petitioners are entitled to 
receive the “true or intrinsic value of [their] stock which has been taken by 
the merger,” which is found by calculating the petitioners’ “proportionate in-
terest in a going concern.”56 That is, an appraisal petitioner holding 1% of the 
outstanding shares would be entitled to 1% of the value of company as a 
standalone entity as of the closing date of the merger, excluding any gain in 
value—such as potential synergies—from the merger itself.57 As a result, the 
fair value of the target company on a standalone basis is the key issue in ap-
praisal. 
Because so few merger class actions reach the damages phase, it is 
primarily in appraisal that Delaware courts have developed their approach 
to calculating fair value.58 Until the 1980s, Delaware had long employed 
                                                                                                                           
quoting Sterling, 93 A.2d at 114)); Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., No. 12883, 1995 WL 
376919, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 15, 1995) (holding that damages for breach of fiduciary duty could 
be calculated through a “quasi-appraisal” remedy), aff’d, 678 A.2d 533 (Del. 1996); see also In re 
Ocean Drilling & Expl. Co. S’holders Litig., No. 11898, 1991 WL 70028, at *7 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 
1991) (concluding that alleged breaches of fiduciary duty did not threaten irreparable harm be-
cause of the availability of “quasi-appraisal” damages); Steiner v. Sizzler Rests. Int’l, Inc., No. 
11994, 1991 WL 40872, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 1991) (same). 
 56 Tri-Cont’l Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950); see also Verition Partners Master 
Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128, 132–33 (Del. 2019) (en banc) (per curiam) 
(“[F]air value ‘is . . . the value of the company to the stockholder as a going concern,” i.e., the 
stockholder’s “proportionate interest in a going concern.” (first quoting M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. 
Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 795 (Del. 1999); and then quoting Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 
1137, 1144 (Del. 1989))); Montgomery Cellular Holding Co. v. Dobler, 880 A.2d 206, 222 (Del. 
2005); Cavalier Oil Corp., 564 A.2d at 1144. 
 57 See, e.g., Cavalier Oil Corp., 564 A.2d at 1144 (noting that the company must be valued 
“without regard to post-merger events”); Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714 (directing the Delaware 
Court of Chancery not to “take speculative effects of the merger into account” in calculating “fair 
value” (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1983))); In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 
A.3d 17, 74 (Del. Ch. 2013) (noting that valuations in appraisal must “back out any synergies”); 
Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc., C.A. No. 5233-VCP, 2012 WL 1569818, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 
2012) (“Determining the value of a ‘going concern’ requires the Court to exclude any synergistic 
value . . . .” (quoting Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Union Fin. Grp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 356 
(Del. Ch. 2004))); Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P’ship, 847 A.2d at 356 (“[T]his court must endeavor 
to exclude from any appraisal award the amount of any value that the selling company’s share-
holders would receive because a buyer intends to operate the subject company, not as a stand-
alone going concern, but as a part of a larger enterprise, from which synergistic gains can be ex-
tracted.”). 
 58 Although appraisal is available in one form or another in almost every state, the bulk of the 
decisional law is in Delaware, with many other state courts taking their doctrinal cues from Dela-
ware. See Thompson, supra note 10, at 10 (describing Delaware as the “leading corporate law 
jurisdiction”). 
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what came to be known as the “Delaware block method”59 (DBM), which 
entailed a fairly robotic calculation with three inputs: (1) the value of the 
company’s assets, (2) the capitalized value of the company’s average earn-
ings over the past five years, and (3) the company’s market value.60 Alt-
hough the court could weigh the three inputs as it saw fit, the method came 
to be seen as too restrictive with the rise of modern finance. Ultimately the 
Delaware Supreme Court moved away from the method in 1983 in the 
landmark case Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., holding that, to the extent it “ex-
cludes other generally accepted techniques used in the financial community 
and the courts, it is now clearly outmoded.”61  
In particular, the DBM had precluded the use of the forward-looking 
DCF methodology—one of the most common and theoretically sound valu-
ation methodologies employed by actual investment professionals. 62 The 
DCF methodology entails projecting the future cash flows of the company 
and discounting them back to present value.63 In the wake of Weinberger, 
the DCF methodology quickly became the preferred valuation tool in Dela-
ware and other courts.64 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See generally William S. Allred, Corporate Law—Chipping Away at the Delaware Block: 
A Critique of the Delaware Block Approach to the Valuation of Dissenters’ Shares in Appraisal 
Proceedings, 8 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 191, 193 (1986) (“For roughly forty years, courts have 
commonly invoked the Delaware block approach to valuation . . . .”). 
 60 See id. at 204–09 (describing the elements of the “Delaware block method”). 
 61 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712. 
 62 See, e.g., In re PetSmart, Inc., C.A. No. 10782, 2017 WL 2303599, at *23 (Del. Ch. May 
26, 2017) (noting “that DCF [discounted cash flow] is considered by many to be the ‘gold stand-
ard’ of valuation tools” (quoting Trial Transcript at 1241:3–:17, 1244:14–45:8, id. (No. 10782)); 
Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., A Lawyer’s Guide to Modern Valuation Techniques in Mergers and 
Acquisitions, 21 J. CORP. L. 457, 461 (1996) (stating that prominent scholars “emphasize the im-
portance of the DCF method of valuation”); Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders’ Appraisal 
Remedy and How Courts Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613, 625–26 n.68 (1998) (“Despite 
its preeminent role in valuation, there was no place for discounted cash flow analysis under the 
Delaware block method; its use did not become permissible in Delaware until Weinberger dis-
carded the block method as the exclusive means of valuation.”).  
 63 See In re Radiology Assocs., Inc. Litig., 611 A.2d 485, 490 (Del. Ch. 1991) (“The DCF 
model entails three basic components: an estimation of net cash flows that the firm will generate 
and when, over some period; a terminal or residual value equal to the future value, as of the end of 
the projection period, of the firm’s cash flows beyond the projection period; and finally a cost of 
capital with which to discount to a present value both the projected net cash flows and the estimat-
ed terminal or residual value.” (quoting Cede & Co. Technicolor, Inc., C.A. No. 7129, 1990 WL 
161084, at *7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990))). 
 64 See, e.g., Questrom v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 483, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (concluding that the DCF is the “preeminent valuation methodology” (quoting Neal v. Ala. 
By-Products Corp., C.A. No. 8282, 1990 WL 109243, at *7 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 1990))), aff’d, 2 
F. App’x 81 (2d Cir. 2001); Lippe v. Bairnco Corp., 288 B.R. 678, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding 
the DCF to be “the most reliable method for determining the value of a business”), aff’d, 99 
F. App’x 274 (2d Cir. 2004); In re Bond, No. 11-bk-33849, 2012 WL 3867427, at *4 (Bankr. D. 
Ariz. Sept. 5, 2012) (noting that the valuation “method preferred in the Second and Seventh Cir-
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The past few years have seen a shift in the Delaware courts’ approach 
to valuation in appraisal. This shift has come, at least in part, in reaction to a 
dramatic increase in the level of appraisal activity and, in particular, in ap-
praisal cases involving publicly traded target companies. 65 Although the 
Delaware courts had occasionally expressed trepidation about the reliability 
of their valuation calculations,66 this self-doubt waxed as the volume of ap-
praisal litigation spiked.67 
Burdened by these doubts, and often facing competing expert DCF 
valuations reaching wildly different conclusions,68 judges looked for a way 
                                                                                                                           
cuits is discounted cash flow”); Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc., C.A. Nos. 20289, 20336, 
2005 WL 2045640, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2005) (“The DCF model of valuation is a standard 
one that gives life to the finance principle that firms should be valued based on the expected value 
of their future cash flows, discounted to present value in a manner that accounts for risk. The DCF 
method is frequently used in this court and, I, like many others, prefer to give it great, and some-
times even exclusive, weight when it may be used responsibly.”); Dobler v. Montgomery Cellular 
Holding Co., C.A. No. 19211, 2004 WL 2271592, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 4, 2004) (noting that DCFs 
are “routinely utilized by this court in appraisal actions”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other 
grounds, 880 A.2d 206 (Del. 2005); see also 1 DONALD J. WOLFE, JR. & MICHAEL A. PITTENGER, 
CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICE IN THE DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY § 9-11[d]-
[1] (2020) (“Since Weinberger, some type of [DCF] methodology has been considered in nearly 
all appraisals . . . .”). 
 65 See generally Korsmo & Myers, supra note 10 (documenting a dramatic increase in public 
company appraisal beginning in 2011). 
 66 See, e.g., Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *9 n.34 (“I stress [that DCFs should be] ‘used 
responsibly,’ for there are situations when the available data will not support the use of the DCF 
model.”); Finkelstein v. Liberty Dig., Inc., C.A. No. 19598, 2005 WL 1074364, at *12 (Del. Ch. 
Apr. 25, 2005) (“The judges of this court are unremittingly mindful of the fact that a judicially 
selected determination of fair value is just that, a law-trained judge’s estimate that bears little 
resemblance to a scientific measurement of a physical reality.”). 
 67  See, e.g., Blueblade Cap. Opportunities LLC v. Norcraft Cos., No. 11184, 2018 WL 
3602940, at *22 n.251 (Del. Ch. July 27, 2018) (noting that “‘the judges of this Court’ have la-
mented the challenges posed by the appraisal statute for many years”); Laidler v. Hesco Bastion 
Env’t, Inc., C.A. No. 7561, 2014 WL 1877536, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2014) (“This case presents 
a demand for a statutory appraisal, response to which should be a daunting task for a law-trained 
judge . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Glob. GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d 497, 518 n.126 
(Del. Ch.) (explaining that “academics and professionals throw around . . . ranges of value [that] 
are used by a law-trained judge to come to a single point estimate of value” and that “[t]he law-
trained judges who must perform such analyses are more conscious than anyone of the inherent 
risk of error in such an endeavor”), aff’d, 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010). 
 68 See, e.g., Kruse v. Synapse Wireless, Inc., C.A. No. 12392, 2020 WL 3969386, at *7 (Del. 
Ch. July 14, 2020) (noting that two experts “utilized the same three valuation techniques . . . but 
reached very different conclusions”); In re Appraisal of Jarden Corp., C.A. No. 12456, 2019 WL 
3244085, at *3 (Del. Ch. July 19, 2019) (“[B]oth parties proffered expert evidence regarding 
Jarden’s fair value based on DCF and, not surprisingly, the experts’ DCF analyses yielded results 
that were solar systems apart.”), aff’d sub nom. Fir Tree Value Master Fund, LP v. Jarden Corp., 
236 A.3d 313 (Del. 2020); Huff Fund Inv. P’ship v. CKx, Inc., C.A. No. 6844, 2013 WL 5878807, 
at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2013) (“The parties have submitted expert valuations of the company, 
ranging from an amount below the sales price (submitted by the Respondents) to more than twice 
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out. One appealing way out was to look to the deal price itself as the best 
evidence of fair value. After all, for most kinds of assets, the best measure 
of financial value is simply the price that a willing buyer and willing seller 
would agree upon in the absence of compulsion.69 As one frustrated Vice 
Chancellor concluded, “A law-trained judge . . . would have no reason to sec-
ond-guess the market price absent demonstration of self-dealing or a flawed 
sales process.”70 In a string of opinions, the Delaware Court of Chancery 
found fair value to be equal to the negotiated deal price, where petitioners 
were unable to show that the deal process was sufficiently flawed.71 
Ultimately, three recent Delaware Supreme Court decisions—
involving Dell, DFC Global, and Aruba Networks—endorsed reliance on 
the deal price in the presence of an adequate sales process.72 In 2017, in 
DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., the Delaware Supreme 
Court noted that “an economist would find that the fair market value of a 
company is what it would sell for when there is a willing buyer and willing 
seller without any compulsion to buy.”73 It went on to note that it had “little 
                                                                                                                           
the sales price (submitted by the Petitioners).”), aff’d, No. 348, 2014, 2015 WL 631586 (Del. Feb. 
12, 2015) (en banc). 
 69 See Huff Fund Inv. P’ship, 2013 WL 5878807, at *1 (“What is the fair value of an asset? 
For a simple asset—a piece of real property, for instance—it is the market value. If a trustee were 
to sell property held in trust, such a sale could be challenged by the beneficiary on a number of 
grounds. It would be odd, however, if the sale were an arms-length, disinterested transaction after 
an adequate market canvas and auction, yet the challenge was that the price received did not rep-
resent ‘fair’ value.”). 
 70 Id. 
 71 See, e.g., Merion Cap. LP v. BMC Software, Inc., C.A. No. 8900, 2015 WL 6164771, at 
*14–15, *18 n.168 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2015); Merlin Partners LP v. AutoInfo, Inc., C.A. No. 8509, 
2015 WL 2069417, at *10 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015); In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., C.A. 
No. 8173, 2015 WL 399726, at *17 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015); Huff Fund Inv. P’ship, 2013 WL 
5878807, at *1. 
 72 See Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128, 135 (Del. 
2019) (en banc) (per curiam); Dell, Inc., v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 
A.3d 1, 23–24 (Del. 2017); DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 362 
(Del. 2017). 
 73 DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 369. Professor Myers and I have cautioned elsewhere that the 
“willing buyer and willing seller” analogy should not be taken too far:  
This might be true if the company were sold by a single owner into a thick market of 
potential buyers. But any analogy between a merger and a transaction between “a 
willing buyer and a willing seller” is virtually useless. In a public company merger, 
the firm will be sold by a board of directors with varying incentives, advised and as-
sisted by inside managers and outside professionals with still different incentives, 
and then put to a stockholder plebiscite on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 
Korsmo & Myers, supra note 11, at 268. We go on to agree, however, that “under certain condi-
tions—conditions that . . . will likely be met in most arm’s-length deals—the outcome of that 
process will be a price that serves as an adequate proxy for what the willing seller and buyer might 
have reached.” Id. 
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quibble with the economic argument that the price of a merger that results 
from a robust market check, against the back drop of a rich information 
base and a welcoming environment for potential buyers, is probative of the 
company’s fair value.”74 It further cautioned that “second-guessing the val-
ue arrived upon by the collective views of many sophisticated parties with a 
real stake in the matter is hazardous.”75 In the face of statutory language 
requiring the courts to consider “all relevant factors” in determining fair 
value, the Delaware Supreme Court declined to create a judicial presump-
tion that deal price equals fair value.76 Nonetheless, in all three cases, the 
court found the deal price to deserve heavy or exclusive weight in determin-
ing fair value.77 
In none of the three cases did the Delaware Supreme Court attempt to 
craft a general definition of when a process would lead to a deal price suffi-
ciently reliable to justify judicial deference as to fair value.78 In 2017, in 
both Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd. and 
DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., however, the Delaware 
Supreme Court overruled trial court opinions that found the sales process 
was too flawed to generate a reliable deal price.79 The strong message to the 
trial judges was that they courted reversal if they failed to sufficiently con-
sider market valuation evidence.80 
In the wake of these opinions from the Delaware Supreme Court, the 
Delaware Court of Chancery has, unsurprisingly, continued to defer to the 
                                                                                                                           
 74 DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 366. 
 75 Id.; see also id. at 369–70 (observing that “[m]arket prices are typically viewed [as] superi-
or to other valuation techniques because, unlike, e.g., a single person’s [DCF] . . . model, the mar-
ket price should distill the collective judgment of the many based on all the publicly available 
information about a given company and the value of its shares”). 
 76 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2020); see Dell, 177 A.3d at 21; DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 
366–67. 
 77 See Aruba Networks, 210 A.3d at 135 (using the deal price as the exclusive basis for its 
determination of fair value); Dell, 177 A.3d at 30 (“Overall, the weight of evidence shows that 
Dell’s deal price has heavy, if not overriding, probative value.”); DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 349 
(finding that deal price was “the best evidence of fair value”). 
 78 See In re Stillwater Mining Co., C.A. No. 2017-0385, 2019 WL 3943851, at *22 (Del. Ch. 
Aug. 21, 2019) (“As with Dell and DFC, the Aruba decision did not have to address when a sale 
process was sufficiently bad that a trial court should decline to rely on the deal price.”), aff’d sub 
nom. Brigade Leveraged Cap. Structures Fund Ltd. v. Stillwater Mining Co., 240 A.3d 3 (Del. 
2020). 
 79 Dell, 177 A.3d at 19; DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 388; see Korsmo & Myers, supra note 11, at 
223.  
 80 As the Delaware Court of Chancery put it in a recent 2019 decision, In re Appraisal of 
Jarden Corp., “I begin my fair value analysis where I believe I must—with the market evidence.” 
C.A. No. 12456, 2019 WL 3244085, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 19, 2019), aff’d sub nom. Fir Tree Value 
Master Fund, LP v. Jarden Corp., 236 A.3d 313 (Del. 2020). 
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negotiated deal price in many appraisal cases.81 In a handful of cases, the 
trial courts have gone further. As noted above, fair value is to exclude pro-
spective values associated with the merger, including synergies.82 Reason-
ing that the negotiated deal price may itself reflect the value of expected 
synergies, the Delaware Supreme Court noted that the pre-announcement 
market trading price may be probative evidence of fair value.83 Even in 
2019, Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., where 
the Delaware Supreme Court overruled a trial court decision deferring to 
the pre-announcement price, it did so due to evidentiary concerns, suggest-
ing that, in the right case, deference to pre-announcement prices may be 
appropriate.84 So far, one trial court has taken up the invitation, awarding 
the pre-announcement market trading price to petitioners. 85 Others have 
acknowledged the evidentiary value of the pre-announcement price, even as 
they ultimately deferred to the deal price instead.86 
Though the Delaware courts have not had recent occasion to opine on 
the relevance of market data in fiduciary duty class actions, in light of re-
cent appraisal decisions it is reasonable to surmise that, all else being equal, 
a deal price is more likely to be considered “fair” if it is substantially above 
the pre-announcement trading price.  
II. DISCLOSURE BUNDLING IN THE SECURITIES FRAUD CONTEXT 
In the wake of Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, commentators 
quickly noted that the United States Supreme Court’s loss causation rules 
would give unscrupulous managers an incentive to engage in strategic dis-
closure practices to obscure market reactions to corrective disclosures—in 
particular, bundling corrective disclosures with other material information. 
More recently, several empirical investigations have sought to investigate 
the prevalence of strategic disclosure bundling, and its effectiveness at de-
terring litigation. This Part provides a brief overview of this literature.87 
Section A discusses scholarship pertaining to the incentive effects of Du-
                                                                                                                           
 81 Stillwater Mining Co., 2019 WL 3943851, at *19–20; In re Appraisal of Columbia Pipeline 
Grp., C.A. No. 12736, 2019 WL 3778370, at *13–20 (Del. Ch. Aug. 12, 2019). 
 82 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 83 See Dell, 177 A.3d at 5–7, 24–27, 35 (concluding that both the trading price and the deal 
price were reliable indicators of value). 
 84 See Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128, 132 (Del. 
2019) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’g No. 11448, 2018 WL 922139 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018). 
 85 See, e.g., In re Jarden Corp., 2019 WL 3244085, at *2 (awarding “the unaffected market 
price”). 
 86 See, e.g., Stillwater Mining Co., 2019 WL 3943851, at *54–55; In re Columbia Pipeline 
Grp., 2019 WL 3778370, at *38–39. 
 87 See discussion infra Part II. 
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ra. 88  Section B explores empirical studies pertaining to disclosure bun-
dling.89 
A. The Incentive Effects of Dura 
Following Dura, Professor James Spindler pointed out that, under 
many plausible circumstances, Dura’s requirement of an ex post market 
decline will under-deter fraud:  
[T]he ex post rule excludes from recovery three cases of fraud: 
(1) when the lie is about a contingency that resolves favorably; 
(2) the contingency resolves unfavorably, but is bundled with pos-
itive news of projects that make up for it; and (3) the contingency 
resolves unfavorably, but is bundled with negative news of exog-
enous events that would have caused the loss anyhow.90 
Because this Article’s concern is strategic disclosure bundling and tim-
ing, I pass over the first scenario91 and focus on the second and third.92 As 
an example of the second, consider a firm where management had fraudu-
lently claimed that a given project—worth $1 billion if successful—had a 
50% chance of success when in fact they knew it really only had a 25% 
chance of success. The lie inflates the market price by $250 million. When 
the project fails, however, the fraud is revealed. If management, however, 
bundles disclosure of the failure and fraud together with news that another 
project has been unexpectedly successful to the tune of $500 million, the 
market price will actually go up. The offsetting positive news obscures the 
                                                                                                                           
 88 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 89 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 90 Spindler, supra note 4, at 674. 
 91 An example of the first problem would be management falsely claiming that a project—
worth $1 billion if it is successful—has a 50% chance of success, when in fact they know that it 
really has only a 25% chance of success. In theory, this lie would inflate the market price by $250 
million. If the project, however, ended up succeeding, there would be no market decline upon 
revelation of the fraud. Nonetheless, allowing a suit in such a case would involve the court in 
estimating both the probabilities and payoffs associated with the success and failure of the project 
in question, neither of which they are particularly well-equipped to do. See id. at 676–77 (noting 
that “there is a greater chance that courts will get things horribly wrong with an ex ante rule”). 
Thus, Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo’s requirement of an ex post market drop is arguably 
justified in such a case, despite the resulting under-deterrence. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 42, at 
538 (explaining the danger of frivolous litigation alleging “phantom loss”). 
 92 Of course, in addition to the difficulties canvassed here, a host of other confounding factors 
can make it difficult or impossible to isolate the market impact of a fraud. See, e.g., Ferrell & 
Saha, supra note 4, at 168 (discussing, among other issues, the problem of gradual or partial leak-
age of the truth, projects that succeed despite a fraud, market over- and under-reactions, and col-
lateral damage from revelation of a fraud). 
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market reaction to revelation of the fraud, making it impossible for plain-
tiffs to show an ex post market decline.93 
The third scenario also involves obscuring the market reaction, this 
time by bundling the corrective disclosure with other negative news. Con-
sider again the same example of management fraudulently claiming a 50% 
chance of success for a $1 billion project that in reality has only a 25% 
chance of success. Again, the project fails and the fraud is on the cusp of 
being revealed. This time, however, management bundles the disclosure 
with news that another $1 billion project, which management had truthfully 
claimed had a 15% chance of success, has also failed. In this scenario, the 
corrective disclosure will be accompanied by a market drop, but it will be 
difficult or impossible for a plaintiff to prove what portion of the drop to 
ascribe to the fraudulent project as opposed to the honest failure.94 
The difficulty in both scenarios is that the event study methodology 
favored post-Dura is generally unable to discern the independent price im-
pacts of bundled news.95 Although tools exist for attempting to tease apart 
the price impacts of simultaneous events, 96 “[w]hen multiple sources of 
news are released at exactly the same time . . . no event study can by itself 
separate out the effects of the different news.”97 As a result, “judicial reli-
ance on event studies creates an incentive for issuers and corporate officials 
to bundle corrective disclosures with other information in a single press re-
                                                                                                                           
 93 For similar examples, see Spindler, supra note 4, at 677–80. 
 94 See, e.g., Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 02-CV-
1152, 2008 WL 4791492, at *11 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2008) (denying class certification because the 
relevant disclosure contained “two distinct components,” a corrective disclosure of prior mis-
statements and new negative information, and the plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate that the 
former caused the stock price decline), aff’d, 597 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2010), vacated sub nom. Erica 
P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804 (2011); Fener v. Belo Corp., 560 F. Supp. 2d 
502, 505 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (denying class certification because the plaintiff was unable to untangle 
the effects of the fraudulent information and “other unrelated negative statements” (quoting Oscar 
Priv. Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 266 (5th Cir. 2007), abrogated by 
Erica P. John Fund, 563 U.S. 804)), aff’d sub nom. Fener v. Operating Eng’rs Constr. Indus. & 
Miscellaneous Pension Fund (LOCAL 66), 579 F.3d 401 (5th Cir. 2009). For similar examples, 
see Spindler, supra note 4, at 680–82.  
 95 See Fisch et al., supra note 36, at 556 (“[I]n cases involving multiple ‘bundled’ disclosures, 
event studies have limited capacity to identify the particular contribution of each piece of infor-
mation or the degree to which the effects of multiple disclosures may offset each other.”)  
 96 See, e.g., Esther Bruegger & Frederick C. Dunbar, Estimating Financial Fraud Damages 
with Response Coefficients, 35 J. CORP. L. 11, 25 (2009) (explaining that “‘content analysis’ is now 
part of the tool kit for determining which among a number of simultaneous news events had effects 
on the stock price” (quoting DAVID TABAK, NERA ECON. CONSULTING, MAKING ASSESSMENTS 
ABOUT MATERIALITY LESS SUBJECTIVE THROUGH THE USE OF CONTENT ANALYSIS 13 (2007), 
https://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/archive1/PUB_Tabak_Content_Analysis_SEC
1646-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/768L-FPGQ])). 
 97 Fisch et al., supra note 36, at 614. 
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lease or filing.”98 Of course, the greater management’s discretion to time 
disclosures, the greater their ability to engage in such bundling. 
B. Empirical Evidence of Disclosure Bundling 
Recently, empirical studies have found evidence that managers have 
indeed responded to doctrinal developments by more often engaging in stra-
tegic disclosure bundling. As predicted, the evidence also suggests that 
bundling is often effective at deterring securities fraud litigation and makes 
it easier to get claims dismissed when they are brought.99 
A 2016 study by Barbara A. Bliss, Frank Partnoy, and Michael Furcht-
gott examined bundling of both positive and negative information when a 
firm releases a restatement.100 As discussed above, bundling in positive in-
formation can offset any decline associated with the restatement, making it 
impossible to satisfy Dura’s loss causation requirement. Bundling in addi-
tional negative information, meanwhile, will magnify the resulting market 
impact, but make it impossible to determine how much of the impact to as-
cribe to the restatement.101 The study used the Dura decision as an exoge-
nous shock. Prior to Dura, the United States Courts of Appeals for the 
Eighth and Ninth Circuits allowed plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss 
by simply asserting that alleged misstatements inflated the stock price. Du-
ra forced these circuits into alignment with the rest of the country.102 The 
authors found that positive and negative bundling were both effective at 
avoiding litigation pre- and post-Dura in most circuits103 and became dra-
                                                                                                                           
 98 Id.; see also id. (“If the presence of overlapping news makes it difficult or impossible for 
plaintiffs to marshal admissible and useful event study evidence, defendants may strategically 
structure their disclosures to impede plaintiffs’ ability to establish price effect.”). 
 99 The phenomenon is not limited to securities fraud litigation. For example, a 2015 study by 
Sebastien Gay examined bundling in the context of firms that had experienced customer privacy 
breaches—another situation likely to lead to litigation. Gay, supra note 5, at 99 (finding that firms 
make a larger than usual number of positive disclosures on the same day they disclose a privacy 
breach). 
 100 See generally Bliss et al., supra note 5. 
 101 See id. at 63 (“Piling bad or confounding news on top of bad news might seem counter-
productive to the extent it amplifies the magnitude of a stock price decline . . . . However, noise 
bundling may generate countervailing benefits by making it difficult or impossible to unravel how 
much of the stock price decline is attributable to each piece of bad news . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 102 See id. at 62, 63 (“The Dura ruling effectively raised the standard for the Eighth and Ninth 
Circuits to the same level that other courts previously imposed. . . . [W]e exploit an exogenous 
shock from the 2005 U.S. Supreme Court ruling on loss causation standards to achieve identifica-
tion in our tests.”). 
 103 Id. at 64 (“[O]ur matching estimator indicates that positive and noise bundling were asso-
ciated with lower litigation occurrence for firms outside the Eighth and Ninth Circuits during both 
time periods.”). 
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matically more effective in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits following Dura.104 
Moreover, they found that when restatements led to a lawsuit, cases involv-
ing bundled restatements were more likely to be dismissed and led to lower 
average settlement values.105 
A 2015 study by two of the same authors, Michael Furchtgott and 
Frank Partnoy, examined whether firms were more likely to engage in bun-
dling post-Dura.106 Again, the authors used the Eighth and Ninth Circuits—
where the Dura decision had worked a sudden change in the law—as their 
testing ground. In sum, they found that large firms—those most likely to be 
targeted in securities fraud actions—“were more likely to bundle news 
[with restatements] than they were before” Dura.” 107  Moreover, “firms 
based in the jurisdictions of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits (whose loss cau-
sation standards were overturned in Dura) changed their disclosure behav-
iors more than firms in other locations.”108 
III. DISCLOSURE BUNDLING IN THE MERGER CONTEXT 
Whereas the literature on disclosure bundling has focused on the secu-
rities fraud context, bundling and strategic timing are perhaps even more 
likely in the merger context. Section A of this Part describes management’s 
incentives and ability to engage in strategic disclosure practices surrounding 
a merger.109 Section B provides preliminary empirical evidence that manag-
ers do, in fact, engage in such practices.110 
A. Disclosure Incentives in the Merger Context 
Even if the pre-announcement market price and the size of the merger 
premium were irrelevant in litigation, managers would still have an incentive 
to make the merger premium look as large as possible. A merger must be ap-
proved by a majority vote of the target company’s stockholders.111 Managers 
may, quite sensibly, believe that a larger premium will make stockholder ap-
                                                                                                                           
 104 Id. at 63 (finding that in the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits “the 
occurrence of litigation dropped from 6.7% to 0% for positive bundled restatements, and from 
20.3% to 5.6% for noise bundled restatements after the tightening of loss causation standards”). 
 105 Id. at 61 (noting that, among restatements that lead to lawsuits, “[b]undled restatements 
have 8.17 times higher dismissal rates and $21.17 to $23.45 million lower settlement amounts”). 
 106 Furchtgott & Partnoy, supra note 5, at 1. 
 107 Id. at 34. 
 108 Id. 
 109 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 110 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 111 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2020). 
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proval more likely and a smaller premium may make stockholder approval 
more challenging.112 
Litigation risk only heightens these incentives. As detailed in Part I, 
judges in merger litigation increasingly look to market pricing as evidence 
of fair value, or as a “reality check” on valuations arrived at by other meth-
odologies, such as a DCF analysis.113 This is especially so in appraisal liti-
gation. In recent cases, this has commonly resulted in courts deferring to the 
prices set by the deal market—the merger price itself. Occasionally, howev-
er, courts have also looked to the pre-announcement market trading price, 
particularly where there may be substantial synergistic value incorporated in 
the merger price.114 
As a result, a large merger premium—the amount by which the merger 
consideration exceeds the pre-announcement price—can make it more diffi-
cult to establish a fair value above the deal price, thus serving as a deterrent 
to litigation. Indeed, in fiduciary duty litigation, Delaware courts, although 
they have repeatedly noted both that the lack of a substantial merger premi-
um does not necessarily mean a deal price is unfair115 and that the presence 
of a large premium does not necessarily establish fairness,116 nonetheless 
                                                                                                                           
 112 See, e.g., Malcolm Baker et al., The Effect of Reference Point Prices on Mergers and Acquisi-
tions, 106 J. FIN. ECON. 49, 64–65 (2012) (observing that deals with higher merger premiums tend to 
close more often); Sangwon Lee & Vijay Yerramilli, Relative Values, Announcement Timing, and 
Shareholder Returns in Mergers and Acquisitions 2 (May 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714572 [https://perma.cc/SW8Z-LGAZ] (adopting 
Malcolm Baker, Xin Pan, and Jeffrey Wurgler’s finding that “key decision makers in the bidding 
and target firms and investors are known to use recent prices as reference points”); see also Veri-
tion Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., C.A. No. 11448, 2018 WL 922139, at 
*33 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018) (noting that “Aruba management believed that an increase in the 
[pre-announcement] stock price would hurt their chances of getting the deal approved”), rev’d, 
210 A.3d 128 (Del. 2019) (en banc) (per curiam). See generally GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, NEGO-
TIAUCTIONS: NEW DEALMAKING STRATEGIES FOR A COMPETITIVE MARKETPLACE 16–18 (2010) 
(explaining the anchoring dynamics in the merger context). 
 113 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 114 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 115 See, e.g., In re MeadWestvaco S’holders Litig., 168 A.3d 675, 687 (Del. Ch. 2017) (“Even 
if it were true that the premium was low, ‘[t]here is no rule that a low premium represents a bad 
deal, much less bad faith.’” (alteration in original) (quoting In re Crimson Expl. Inc. S’holder 
Litig., C.A. No. 8541, 2014 WL 5449419, at *23 (Del. Ch. Oct. 24, 2014))); In re BJ’s Wholesale 
Club, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6623, 2013 WL 396202, at *11–12 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2013) 
(granting a motion to dismiss in a case with a 6.6% merger premium); In re Dollar Thrifty 
S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 619 (Del. Ch. 2010) (denying a preliminary injunction in a case with 
a 5.5% merger premium); In re CompuCom Sys., Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 499, 2005 WL 
2481325, at *8 (Del. Ch. Sept. 29, 2005) (granting a motion to dismiss where the deal price was at 
a discount to the pre-announcement trading price). 
 116 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 875 (Del. 1985) (“[T]he fact of a premium 
alone does not provide an adequate basis upon which to assess the fairness of an offering price.”), 
overruled by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009); In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders 
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frequently point to the presence of a substantial merger premium as sugges-
tive of fairness.117 As the Delaware Court of Chancery summarized, “Dela-
ware law recognizes that, although market price should be considered in an 
appraisal, the market price of shares is not always indicative of fair val-
ue.”118 Even where courts do not explicitly place weight upon the market 
price, it may—consciously or otherwise—serve as a reference point anchor-
ing the ultimate valuation.119 In general, a larger merger premium will make a 
plaintiff’s success at trial more difficult and may deter litigation altogether.120 
If managers are afraid that a soon-to-be-announced merger is at an in-
adequate premium to the merger price, perhaps the most straightforward 
way to increase the premium is to release bad news prior to the announce-
ment of the merger, driving the stock price lower. Similarly, the managers 
would want to delay release of any good news until after (or simultaneous 
with) the merger announcement, avoiding the risk of the stock price rising 
to near or above the merger price. 
                                                                                                                           
Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 818–19 (Del. Ch. 2019) (same, despite a 40% premium); In re El Paso Corp. 
S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 434–45 (Del. Ch. 2012) (noting a reasonable probability of success 
on the merits of a breach of fiduciary duty claim, despite a 47.8% merger premium); In re Tele-
commcn’s, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 16470, 2005 WL 3642727, at *1–2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 10, 
2006) (explaining that the defendants had not demonstrated entire fairness at the summary judg-
ment stage, despite a 37% merger premium); Gholl v. eMachines, Inc., C.A. No. 19444, 2004 WL 
2847865, at *15 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 2004) (giving “little weight” to the “control premium argu-
ment,” despite a merger premium of 96%), aff’d, 875 A.2d 632 (Del. 2005).  
 117 See, e.g., Cinerama, Inc., v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1176–77 (Del. 1995) (point-
ing to the size of the merger premium as the first “reliable source[] . . . indicat[ing] that the $23 
per share received” constituted a fair price (quoting Cinerama, Inc., v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 
1134, 1142 (Del. Ch. 1994), aff’d, id.)); In re Stillwater Mining Co., No. 2017-0385, 2019 WL 
3943851, at *44 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 2019) (noting “the premium over market” as a reason for find-
ing that the deal price represented fair value), aff’d sub nom. Brigade Leveraged Cap. Structures 
Fund Ltd. v. Stillwater Mining Co., 240 A.3d 3 (Del. 2020); In re Morton’s Rest. Grp. S’holders 
Litig., 74 A.3d 656, 662–63, 676 (Del. Ch. 2013) (explaining a merger’s status as a “premium-
generating transaction” and “a premium sale of a company” in dismissing a fiduciary duty claim); 
Gholl, 2004 WL 2847865, at *15 (“In many cases market indicia of value such as control premi-
ums . . . can provide informative checks on the reasonableness of financial valuation tech-
niques.”). 
 118 In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at 
*23 (Del. Ch. June 4, 2004). 
 119 See Colin Miller, Anchors Away: Why the Anchoring Effect Suggests That Judges Should 
Be Able to Participate in Plea Discussions, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1667, 1693 (2013) (“The ‘anchoring 
effect’ is a cognitive bias by which individuals evaluate numbers in relation to a reference point—
the anchor—and then modify those numbers based on that ‘anchor.’ The bias manifests itself in 
three particular ways: (1) the selection of an anchor; (2) underadjustment; and (3) the fact that 
even arbitrary, random, or irrelevant numbers can serve as anchors and distort calculations.” 
(footnote omitted) (quoting Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2516 (2004))). 
 120 See, e.g., Korsmo & Myers, supra note 7, at 835 (finding that appraisal litigation becomes 
less likely as the size of the merger premium increases). 
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Managers have a great deal of flexibility to time their disclosures in 
this fashion, particularly with respect to one of the most common types of 
good or bad news: quarterly earnings announcements. Quarterly earnings 
need not be released on a fixed schedule. Instead, most companies have a 
forty-day window from the end of their fiscal quarter during which to report 
their quarterly earnings on Form 10-Q.121 Even this loose deadline can be 
extended by filing an NT 10-Q untimely filing form.122 Similarly, depend-
ing on the dynamics of the merger process, the parties may have substantial 
flexibility in deciding when to announce the deal publicly. In fact, it is ex-
tremely common for the parties to a merger to bundle together the deal an-
nouncement with an earnings release, making it difficult or impossible to 
disentangle the market’s reaction to the two pieces of material infor-
mation.123 
The recent 2019 Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Net-
works, Inc. appraisal case provides a nice example of how managers might 
respond to this mix of litigation and non-litigation incentives by using their 
ability to strategically time and bundle disclosures. In early 2015, Hewlett-
                                                                                                                           
 121 See Revisions to Accelerated Filer Definition and Accelerated Deadlines for Filing Period-
ic Reports, Securities Act Release No. 8644, Exchange Act Release No. 52,989, 70 Fed. Reg. 
76,626 (Dec. 27, 2005). 
 122See Adam Hayes, SEC Form NT 10-Q, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/s/sec-form-nt-10-q.asp [https://perma.cc/G5BN-FH7D] (last updated July 5, 2020) (“SEC 
Form NT 10-Q is a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filing required for companies that 
will not be able to submit their 10-Q filing (for quarterly financial results) by the SEC deadline or 
in a timely manner.”). 
 123 See, e.g., Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., C.A. No. 11448, 
2018 WL 922139, at *33 n.316 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018) (“[I]t’s very customary, very, very cus-
tomary, if you’re pursuing an M & A transaction and it’s close to being done, . . . and you have an 
earnings release, to make the two concurrent, because these are two material events that will im-
pact the stock price, and the last thing you want to do is release material information piecemeal to 
your shareholders.” (alteration in original) (quoting Boutros Dep. at 203, id. (No. 11448))), rev’d, 
210 A.3d 128 (Del. 2019) (en banc) (per curiam); In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 
573, 591 (Del. Ch. 2010) (noting the “normal desire to announce the deal in conjunction with an 
earnings release”); In re Trans World Airlines, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 9844, 1988 WL 
111271, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1988) (“The proposal now under consideration was announced 
. . . the same day on which the [c]ompany announced very favorable financial results for the first 
quarter of 1988.”), abrogated by Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994). 
Similarly, if management believes the merger premium is already adequate, they may be tempted 
to bury bad news by bundling it together with a merger announcement. See, e.g., In re Appraisal 
of DFC Glob. Corp., C.A. No. 10107, 2016 WL 3753123, at *13 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2016) 
(“[D]iscouraging financial results [were] issued on April 2, 2014, the same day the transaction was 
announced.”), rev’d sub nom. DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346 
(Del. 2017); see also Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 591 (“Dollar Thrifty’s advisors were suspicious 
that Hertz wanted to use the deal to cover up what would be an otherwise disappointing earnings 
announcement . . . .”). In particular, a merger announcement may be the “good news” to offset a 
restatement in the securities fraud context. See discussion supra Part I. 
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Packard was in confidential negotiations to acquire Aruba Networks and 
made an offer of $23.25 per share.124 While the offer was pending, analyst 
opinion of Aruba was largely negative, expecting reduced earnings going 
forward, and the stock price languished around sixteen dollars per share.125 
Internally, however, Aruba management knew that the company was “hav-
ing an excellent quarter and would beat its guidance.”126 Nonetheless, Aru-
ba management was determined to delay release of the positive earnings 
news until announcement of the merger. 127 Ultimately, the earnings and 
merger announcement were bundled together, and HP apparently leaked 
news of the merger a day early to further muddy the market reaction to 
Aruba’s positive earnings.128 
Aruba’s management was apparently motivated both by litigation and 
non-litigation factors. As for non-litigation factors, “Aruba management 
believed that an increase in the stock price would hurt their chances of get-
ting the deal approved.”129 At the same time, Aruba and Hewlett-Packard’s 
management hoped to “blur the market’s reaction to Aruba’s strong quarter-
ly results”130 in a way the Delaware Supreme Court noted “might make it 
difficult for an expert to disentangle . . . for purposes of an event study.”131 
Indeed, bankers at Qatalyst—one of Aruba’s deal advisors—“speculated 
internally that HP had leaked the news [of the deal] so that Aruba’s ‘results 
and subsequent stock price reaction won’t be easy to measure.’”132 
                                                                                                                           
 124 See Aruba Networks, 2018 WL 922139, at *33 (“At the end of January 2015, HP offered 
to acquire Aruba for $23.25 per share.”). 
 125 Id. (“During the first week of February, while Aruba was considering its response, another 
analyst report criticized [Aruba], and the stock price fell again, closing around $16.07 the day after 
the report.”). 
 126 Id. 
 127 See id. (“[R]ather than correcting the market’s perception, Aruba management proposed to 
time the announcement of the merger to coincide with the announcement of Aruba’s February 
2015 earnings.”); id. at *33 n.315 (noting that “[t]he idea of announcing the merger along with 
Aruba’s strong quarterly results came from Aruba management” and that management wanted to 
“get[] a deal announced by [Aruba’s] earnings on Feb. 26” (third alteration in original) (quoting 
JX 454, internal Barclays email summarizing Johansson’s relay of the call)). 
 128 See id. at *33 n.317 (“HP also may have leaked news of the deal to further mask the sig-
nificance of Aruba’s strong earnings. On February 25, 2015, one day before Aruba was scheduled 
to announce its earnings, Bloomberg News ran a story on the merger.”). 
 129 Id. at *33; see also id. *33 n.315 (stating that Aruba’s bankers “‘emphasized that [Aruba 
would] like to announce [the] deal before the [Aruba] earnings announcement’ because Aruba was 
‘afraid stock runs like Ubiquiti’s did which could make the deal more challenging from the [Aru-
ba] perspective’” (alterations in original) (quoting JX 491, email from Barclays to HP recounting 
exchange)). 
 130 Id. at *33. 
 131 Id. at *34. 
 132 Id. at *33 n.317 (quoting JX 510, internal Qatalyst email). 
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B. Potential Empirical Evidence 
It would be a relatively straightforward matter to test empirically 
whether parties to a merger engage in strategic bundling or timing of disclo-
sures. One simple test would be to examine the timing of merger and earn-
ings announcements. As noted above, the folk wisdom is that management 
often like to announce earnings in concert with a merger. One potential mo-
tivation for such bundling would be to bury especially bad earnings news by 
combining it with the (typically) good news of a merger. The incentives dis-
cussed above, however, point in the opposite direction. All else being equal, 
managers would like the merger to be as large a premium as possible to the 
pre-announcement trading price. The more likely the merger is to be the 
subject of either litigation or a contested stockholder vote, the stronger these 
countervailing incentives. 
As a result, I would expect that the more likely litigation or a contested 
stockholder vote are, the less likely that negative earnings news would be 
bundled, and the more likely it would be released prior to the earnings an-
nouncement. The release of the negative earnings news in advance of the 
merger announcement would drive down the market price and maximize the 
apparent attractiveness of the merger premium. At the same time, I would 
expect that the more likely litigation or a contested stockholder vote are, the 
more likely positive earnings news would be released simultaneously with 
or after the merger announcement. Doing so would avoid an inconvenient 
increase in the trading price and correspondingly smaller merger premium. 
Testing these propositions should be relatively simple. The hypothesis 
would be that the higher the litigation/approval risk, the greater the likeli-
hood that negative earnings results are released before, and positive earn-
ings simultaneously or after, a merger announcement. Testing this hypothe-
sis would require an investigator to examine merger announcements and the 
nearest earnings announcement by the target company. The investigator 
would then need to characterize the earnings announcement as positive or 
negative by assessing whether it exceeded or fell short of analyst expecta-
tions. The investigator would also need to quantify the level of litiga-
tion/stockholder approval risk.133 Finally, the investigator would calculate the 
relationship between this risk and the timing of earnings announcements. 
                                                                                                                           
 133 Quantifying litigation/stockholder approval risk would likely be the most difficult step. 
Nonetheless, a number of potential proxies are available. Among them are: (1) the size of the 
merger premium; (2) P/E ratios at the merger price; (3) Tobin’s Q at the merger price; (4) the 
actual results of the eventual stockholder vote; and (5) the actual incidence of merger class actions 
or appraisal actions targeting the merger. 
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IV. POTENTIAL REGULATORY RESPONSES 
Earlier scholarship on disclosure bundling has been largely content to 
describe the issue. To the extent reforms are proposed, they have mostly 
been restricted to the tacit implication that Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
Broudo’s loss causation rules ought to be reconsidered.134 In Parts IV and V, 
I provide more concrete proposals.135 This Part considers potential regulato-
ry responses to disclosure bundling and strategic disclosure timing—in par-
ticular, whether the SEC could and should require “unbundled” disclosures 
in certain contexts.136 It consists of three sections. Section A considers the 
extent to which private ordering can be expected to ameliorate strategic dis-
closure practices.137 Section B reviews whether an unbundling requirement 
would conflict with the traditional design of SEC disclosure require-
ments.138 Section C examines the potential design of unbundling rules.139 
In short, I conclude (1) that private ordering is unlikely to be effective; 
(2) that unbundling rules would be a somewhat awkward fit with traditional 
SEC disclosure rules; and (3) that, nonetheless, there may be a role for dis-
closure unbundling rules. The limited potential for unbundling rules, how-
ever, means they will need to be supplemented by doctrinal modifications, 
which Part V discusses.140 
A. Private Ordering 
Regulatory action would be unnecessary if private ordering could be 
expected to provide efficient incentives for management to refrain from 
strategic disclosure practices. It is theoretically possible that market incen-
tives would encourage management to credibly commit to unbundled dis-
closures. As Parts II and III discuss, strategic disclosure practices appear to 
effectively allow managers to escape liability for securities fraud or a 
breach of a fiduciary duty.141 The market may, therefore, discount the price 
                                                                                                                           
 134  See, e.g., Spindler, supra note 4, at 691 (concluding that Dura Pharmaceuticals v. 
Broudo’s rule “does not adequately internalize fraud losses when firms can bundle projects, when 
firms can wait before disclosing bad news, or when other factors may overlap with the fraud in 
causing a plaintiff’s loss”); Furchtgott & Partnoy, supra note 5, at 34 (“Our results may have the 
normative implication that the courts should consider relaxing the Dura loss causation pleading 
requirements if there are multiple pieces of firm-specific news occurring simultaneously or if there 
is evidence of a pre-announcement downward drift in the share price.”). 
 135 See discussion infra Parts IV, V. 
 136 See discussion infra Part IV. 
 137 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 138 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 139 See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 140 See discussion infra Part V. 
 141 See discussion supra Parts II, III. 
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of shares in firms that retain the ability to engage in such practices. Con-
versely, if a firm’s managers can credibly commit that they will not engage 
in such practices, that firm’s shares should be able to command a premium 
relative to other firms.142 Because managers, in general, benefit from higher 
market valuations of the firms they manage, this dynamic could give them 
an incentive to commit to forbearing from abusive disclosure practices.143 
The questions, then, are whether it is easy to credibly commit to un-
bundled disclosures and how powerful the incentives are to do so. Unfortu-
nately, the answers to these two questions are intertwined and appear to be 
“no” and “not very,” respectively. Taking the securities fraud context first, 
the main difficulty is that management itself will generally be the only party 
that knows when a material corrective disclosure is warranted. But at the 
time that happens, the possibility of avoiding securities fraud liability—
which typically entails direct, personal liability for the managers—will al-
most always significantly outweigh any indirect, theoretical benefits from 
maintaining a credible commitment to unbundled disclosures.144 Any suit 
for a breach of the promise to maintain unbundled disclosures would face 
the same evidentiary problems as the underlying securities fraud suit. 
Management’s incentives are even worse in the merger context. Mer-
gers are, in game-theoretic terms, a “final period” decision.145 Following a 
merger, the target company’s stock will no longer trade and the managers 
will be cashed out along with the stockholders. As a result, market disci-
                                                                                                                           
 142 See Spindler, supra note 4, at 658 (“[I]f a firm values transparency or values the confi-
dence that shareholders have when a firm is subject to strict antifraud penalties, firms can choose 
to unbundle their projects and disclosures.”); id. at 685 (“We may suppose that, at equilibrium, a 
rational marketplace would discount securities of firms that have bundled projects and disclosures. 
A firm that can commit to disaggregating itself and its disclosures could therefore command a 
premium relative to aggregated firms.”). 
 143 See id. at 685 (“Market incentives may therefore drive voluntary disaggregation.”). 
 144 See id. at 658 (“The extent to which firms can unbundle themselves and their disclosures 
may, however, be limited, and the costs of doing so may be significant even where possible.”); id. 
at 687 (“Is there any way for a firm to commit credibly beforehand not to bundle negative infor-
mation with other information? This seems to be a significant problem, because the firm itself will 
likely be the only party that knows when it has come into new material information.”). 
 145 See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon-Land, 81 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 3277, 3292 (2013) (“[S]tructural decisions—such as corporate takeovers—present a final 
period problem entailing an especially severe conflict of interest.”); Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protec-
tion Provisions in the Last Period of Play, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1945 (2003) (“Another 
corporate law last period problem occurs when a company is sold . . . .”); Charles R. Korsmo, 
Delaware’s Retreat from Judicial Scrutiny of Mergers, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 55, 90 (2019) 
(“[W]hile most managerial decisions take place in the context of on ongoing series of repeat trans-
actions, the decision to approve a merger is, in game theoretic terms, a ‘final period’ transaction.” 
(quoting Bainbridge, supra, at 3292)). 
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pline of managerial opportunism melts away in the merger context.146 By 
the time a merger agreement is in hand, the value to management of main-
taining a credible commitment to wholesome disclosure practices is effec-
tively zero. As a result, private ordering is unlikely to be effective.147 
B. The Traditional Role of Disclosure 
“[F]ederal securities regulation has three principal components: (1) 
mandatory disclosure [requirements]; (2) prohibitions on securities fraud; 
and (3) restrictions on insider trading.”148 The key source of disclosure re-
quirements is Regulation S-K, which has been promulgated by the SEC un-
der the authority of the Securities Act of 1933.149 Regulation S-K requires 
regular disclosure of numerous types of information, including both quanti-
tative financial metrics and qualitative descriptions of the firm’s business 
and assets. Other disclosure requirements are continuous. In particular, 
Form 8-K requires firms to promptly disclose—within four business days—
certain types of material events.150 
Historically, disclosure requirements have often been spoken of in 
terms of investor protection. The emerging consensus, however, is that in-
vestors can best protect themselves by simply ensuring the market has the 
information it needs to value securities accurately.151 As a result, the prima-
ry goal of disclosure regulation is making sure the disclosures provide the 
market with the necessary information in as close to real time as possible. 
Sophisticated investors can then use that information to value the relevant 
securities, simultaneously protecting ordinary investors and promoting effi-
                                                                                                                           
 146 See Korsmo, supra note 145, at 90 (“For most decisions, managerial discretion is heavily 
constrained by a large number of legal and extra-legal constraints, including annual director elec-
tions, regular reports under securities law, product markets, capital markets, and labor markets, 
among others. Managers who behave foolishly or dishonestly in one period face the possibility of 
being found out, punished, or shamed in the next. Such constraints do not operate in the context of 
a final period transaction like a merger.” (footnote omitted)). 
 147 See Spindler, supra note 4, at 685 (concluding that committing to disaggregated disclosure 
is “likely to be imperfect or costly”). 
 148 Charles R. Korsmo, The Audience for Corporate Disclosure, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1581, 
1590 (2017); see, e.g., Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities 
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 716 (2006) (“The law of securities regulation may be divided into 
three broad categories: disclosure duties, restrictions on fraud and manipulation, and restrictions 
on insider trading.”); Kevin S. Haeberle & M. Todd Henderson, Information-Dissemination Law: 
The Regulation of How Market-Moving Information Is Revealed, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1373, 
1377 (2016) (describing “mandatory-disclosure, securities-fraud, and insider-trading law” as “the 
core of modern securities regulation”). 
 149 See generally 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2020). 
 150 See Form 8-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/form8-k.pdf [https://
perma.cc/79X2-J84Q].  
 151 See Korsmo, supra note 148, at 1586. 
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cient allocation of capital.152 Any rule requiring unbundled disclosure would 
be at least somewhat in tension with the goal of prompt disclosure of mate-
rial information. Often, a firm will come into possession of multiple pieces 
of material information simultaneously. In such circumstances, unbundled 
disclosure would require deliberately delaying disclosure of some infor-
mation. The result is an inevitable trade-off of a requirement of unbundled 
disclosures and a requirement of prompt disclosure of new information. 
Nonetheless, the conflict should not be overstated. Form 8-K already 
provides firms with the flexibility to delay the release of new material in-
formation by four days, and earnings releases—chock-full of material in-
formation—may be made at any time within a multi-week window.153 De-
terring securities fraud is also one of the core functions of securities regula-
tion. A narrowly drawn unbundling rule may help to do so without unduly 
delaying the market’s receipt of material information. Similarly, although 
the corporate governance concerns surrounding mergers are not a traditional 
focus of federal securities law, as Section C discusses, the necessary altera-
tions to existing disclosure requirements would be minimal. 
C. Requiring Unbundled Disclosure 
A rule that all material disclosures be unbundled is manifestly unwork-
able and would likely generate more problems than it solves. What is re-
quired to prevent opportunistic bundling of information, however, is much 
more limited. The guiding principle is straightforward: if market evidence is 
to be determinative at trial, measures should be taken to ensure that the 
market evidence is as clear and reliable as possible. As such, ideally, issuers 
would be required to make all corrective disclosures individually, disaggre-
gated from other material information, such that the market reaction can 
provide a clear measure of the revealed fraud, unmuddied by bundled dis-
closures. The difficulty with such a requirement is two-fold: (1) that it 
would often require release of material information to be delayed; and (2) 
that it is difficult to clearly define “corrective disclosure.” 
The first difficulty is not so serious. It is certainly the case that where a 
firm comes into possession of multiple pieces of material information sim-
ultaneously, some corrective of earlier misstatements and some not, disclo-
sure of one or more pieces of information would have to be delayed to re-
lease the corrective disclosure on its own. Yet, this is not out of the ordinary. 
As noted above, even the 8-K continuous disclosure obligations only re-
quire new information to be disclosed within four business days. This win-
                                                                                                                           
 152 Id. 
 153 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
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dow provides ample room to separate corrective from non-corrective dis-
closures. Indeed, even for relatively complex information, the market reac-
tion is often almost immediate, with prices reaching a new equilibrium in a 
matter of seconds or minutes. 154 As long as the corrective disclosure is 
made separately, it would rarely be problematic to release other information 
even later in the same day. 
The second difficulty is more serious. The problem is two-fold. First, 
managers are rarely able and willing to simply admit that earlier misstate-
ments are fraudulent. Second, the truth will often emerge in drips and drabs, 
with the market gradually decreasing the probability it attributes to the truth 
of a misstatement, thus muting the ultimate market impact of any eventual 
corrective disclosure. As a result, even though Dura ties the loss causation 
requirement to market impact upon a corrective disclosure, the lower courts 
have struggled to determine what exactly constitutes a corrective disclo-
sure.155 Indeed, during oral argument in Dura itself, Justice Stephen Breyer 
noted that the truth as to an earlier misstatement “might come out in many 
different ways,” and not only “because [an executive] announces I’m a li-
ar.”156 
Grabbing hold of Justice Breyer’s suggestion, lower courts have—
despite a lack of consensus as to what does constitute a corrective disclo-
sure—consistently rejected the notion that it must be a “mirror image” of 
the fraudulent statements being corrected.157 Although a “classic” corrective 
                                                                                                                           
 154 See Grace Xing Hu et al., Early Peek Advantage? Efficient Price Discovery with Tiered 
Information Disclosure, J. FIN. ECON. 399, 402 (2017); Charles R. Korsmo, High-Frequency 
Trading: A Regulatory Strategy, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 523, 524–25 (2014). 
 155 See generally Matthew L. Mustokoff & Margaret E. Mazzeo, Loss Causation on Trial in 
Rule 10b-5 Litigation a Decade After Dura, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 175, 196–99 (2017) (discuss-
ing circuit court attempts to define “corrective disclosure” and concluding that “[t]he line delineat-
ing what type of information is and is not corrective is far from clear”). 
 156 Transcript of Oral Argument at 38–39, Dura Pharms., Inc., v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) 
(No. 03-932). 
 157 See, e.g., Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 230 (5th Cir. 
2009) (“To be corrective, [a] disclosure need not precisely mirror [an] earlier misrepresentation.” 
(alterations in original) (quoting In re Williams Sec. Litig.—WCG Subclass, 558 F.3d 1130, 1140 
(10th Cir. 2009))); Freudenberg v. E*Trade Fin. Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 171, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(“[N]either the Supreme Court in Dura, nor any other court addressing the loss causation pleading 
standard require a corrective disclosure to be a ‘mirror image’ tantamount to a confession of 
fraud.”); In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., C.A. No. 00-1990, 2005 WL 2007004, at *20 
(D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2005) (rejecting the “proposition that an alleged corrective disclosure must be the 
linguistic mirror image of the alleged fraud”). See generally Mustokoff & Mazzeo, supra note 
155, at 196–99 (“Notwithstanding divergence among the circuit courts on the question of what 
constitutes a corrective disclosure, there appears to be general agreement that to be corrective, a 
disclosure need not be a defendant’s express admission or acknowledgement of the fraud; in other 
words, it need not be a ‘mirror image’ of the fraudulent statement(s) being ‘corrected.’” (first 
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disclosure might be a frank admission of earlier misstatement accompanied 
by the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, in practice fraudu-
lent misstatements will often be corrected in a piecemeal, haphazard fashion 
that defies easy definition.158 As a result, any rule requiring unbundling of 
“corrective disclosures” will inevitably be underinclusive in its definition of 
“corrective disclosure.” 
Nonetheless, the perfect need not be the enemy of the good. Even a 
narrow, underinclusive unbundling rule—requiring unbundling of only 
clearly corrective disclosures—is better than no rule at all. It would impose 
few costs and be helpful in at least some cases, particularly the worst ones 
involving clear and uncontroversial fraud. As Part V details, less straight-
forward cases can be addressed by doctrinal adjustments to Dura that would 
allow plaintiffs to use alternative methods of showing loss causation in ap-
propriate cases.159 
Two types of disclosures are particularly well-suited to an unbundling 
requirement. The first is a financial restatement. A financial restatement is 
defined by the Financial Accounting Standards Board as a revision of a pre-
viously issued financial statement to correct an error.160 Less serious errors 
can be corrected in a firm’s periodic financial disclosures, but an error so se-
rious that earlier statements can no longer be relied upon must be disclosed in 
a 4.02-8K disclosure within four days of its discovery.161 Such restatements 
often signal that earlier disclosures were potentially fraudulent, and they are 
frequently the trigger for securities fraud class actions.162 To make the mar-
ket reaction to the restatement as informative as possible, the SEC should 
                                                                                                                           
quoting Freudenberg, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 202; and then quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb, 2005 WL 
2007004, at *20)). 
 158 See, e.g., In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 634 F. Supp. 2d 352, 363–65 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (noting that a “corrective disclosure is traditionally an admission by the company that one 
or more of its previous statements were false or misleading followed by a corrected, truthful and 
complete version of those statements” but “[t]he [disclosure] event need not take this form” .in 
order “to prove loss causation”). 
 159 See discussion infra Part V. 
 160 See ACCT. STANDARDS CODIFICATION § 250-10-50-7 (FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD. 2020). 
 161 See Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date, Secu-
rities Act Release No. 33-8400, Exchange Act Release No. 49,424, 69 Fed. Reg. 15,594 (Mar. 25, 
2004); Philip Keunho Chung & Ronnie Cohen, Hiding in Plain Sight: Stealth Restatements and 
Their Implication for Litigation Risk, 15 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 257, 266 (2019) (“After the SEC 
Final Rule mandating additional Form 8-K disclosures, firms must decide whether the past finan-
cial statements which contain material errors can still be relied upon; if not, the firm must disclose 
the errors and restatements using 4.02–8K disclosure within four business days of this decision.”). 
 162 See Chung & Cohen, supra note 161, at 283 (finding that a 4.02-8K disclosure “is associ-
ated with higher securities class action suits risk”); Furchtgott & Partnoy, supra note 5, at 6 (not-
ing that “nearly half” of their sample of securities fraud class actions were filed within two weeks 
of an accounting restatement). 
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require that 4.02-8K disclosures be made individually, unbundled with other 
disclosures. This should be easily achieved, given the four-day window 
within which the restatement may be announced. 
The attraction of such a requirement is that, instead of needing to de-
fine the information it applies to, it would piggy-back on an existing disclo-
sure requirement involving a defined set of obviously securities fraud-
related information. Although the definitions of what must be required via 
4.02-8K may not be as clear as we would like,163 they are a good start. If 
combined with clearer definitions of the type of accounting errors that must 
be disclosed via a 4.02-8K disclosure, such an unbundling requirement 
would go a long way toward providing more reliable market evidence of the 
magnitude of an important class of securities fraud. 
The second type of disclosure that could productively be subjected to 
an unbundling requirement is announcement of a government investigation 
or subpoena. Such an announcement, although not “corrective” in and of 
itself, can be a signal to the market that a corrective announcement is likely 
to follow, and it can produce a more dramatic market impact than the even-
tual corrective disclosure.164 An unbundling rule for government investiga-
tions will undoubtedly be overinclusive—the opening of an investigation 
does not always portend liability. But the cost and difficulty of unbundling 
this limited universe of disclosures are minimal, and doing so will lead to a 
more reliably informative market reaction in that subset of cases where 
fraud is ultimately uncovered. 
Unbundling in the merger context is at once simpler than in the securi-
ties fraud context, but less likely to be effective in ensuring accurate market 
evidence for courts. It is simpler because the disclosure to be unbundled is 
easy to define—the announcement that the target company’s board has ap-
proved a merger agreement. It is less effective because it would still provide 
little assurance that the market price is fully informative in a future judicial 
proceeding. In addition to the problem of leaks and publicity prior to the 
merger announcement—factors that may also be present in the securities 
fraud context—any information that comes out after the merger announce-
ment will not generate a meaningful market reaction. It is not uncommon 
                                                                                                                           
 163 See generally Chung & Cohen, supra note 161, at 284 (calling on the SEC to provide 
“more guidance as to the types of errors that warrant a non-reliance judgment and the attendant 
4.02-8K disclosure” to “curb firms’ opportunistic choices” to avoid making a 4.02-8K disclosure). 
 164 See, e.g., Lloyd v. CVB Fin. Corp., 811 F.3d 1200, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that 
the announcement of an SEC subpoena regarding potential misstatements caused the company’s 
stock to “drop precipitously” although “the market reacted hardly at all” to the firm’s eventual 
admission of its misstatements); Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. Amedisys, Inc., 769 F.3d 313, 
324–25 (5th Cir. 2014) (recognizing the sharp stock drops accompanying the announcement of 
government investigations into allegedly fraudulent practices). 
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for many months to pass between the announcement of a merger and its 
actual consummation. During this time, the market price is typically pegged 
more to the value of the merger consideration rather than the value of the 
underlying business as a standalone concern. Valuation for litigation pur-
poses is generally as of the time of the closing—by explicit statutory com-
mand in the case of appraisal.165 Thus, it is not enough that disclosure be 
unbundled. Even in the face of an unbundling rule, managers may simply 
wait to disclose earnings information until after the merger announcement, 
thus obscuring any market reaction. 
For the market price to be as informative as possible, all material in-
formation known as of the closing of the merger would have to be disclosed 
prior to the announcement of the merger—an obvious impossibility absent 
substantial advances in time-travel technology (where progress has been 
notoriously slow). As a result, an unbundling requirement is merely an ob-
stacle to the most blatantly opportunistic disclosure practices. The real work 
in the merger context must be done by doctrinal refinements, which Part V 
discusses.166 
V. POTENTIAL DOCTRINAL REFINEMENTS 
As Part IV explains, regulatory unbundling requirements can only go 
so far in preventing opportunistic disclosure practices.167 In the securities 
fraud context, any unbundling rule will inevitably be underinclusive. And in 
the merger context, management can achieve the same result—obscuring 
the market reaction to new information—by simply waiting to disclose until 
after the announcement of the merger. If opportunistic disclosure practices 
are to be discouraged, courts must have the doctrinal flexibility to use non-
market valuation evidence in appropriate circumstances. 
Section A sketches the doctrinal refinements to Dura Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. v. Broudo’s loss causation requirement.168 Section B discusses the im-
plications of market evidence in the context of merger litigation valua-
tion.169 The guiding principles are, again, straightforward. Market evidence 
is, as current doctrine reflects, generally the best valuation evidence in secu-
rities fraud and merger litigation. Where market evidence is obscured, how-
ever, it may be necessary and appropriate to rely on other valuation evi-
dence. Indeed, to the extent courts are unable or unwilling to look to non-
                                                                                                                           
 165 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2020). 
 166 See discussion infra Part V. 
 167 See discussion supra Part IV. 
 168 See discussion infra Part V.A. 
 169 See discussion infra Part V.B. 
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market valuation evidence, managers will have a strong incentive to delib-
erately obscure market evidence through the opportunistic disclosure prac-
tices discussed above. Thus, courts should maintain the ability to use non-
market valuation evidence: both (1) to serve as a second-best solution in the 
absence of reliable market evidence; and (2) to discourage managers from 
avoiding the creation of reliable market evidence in the first place. 
A. Refining Dura’s Loss Causation Requirement 
The great advantage of Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo’s re-
quirement of a market impact to show loss causation is that it will often 
provide a reliable measurement of damages, in the form of an event study 
showing the existence and magnitude of an abnormal price reaction to a 
corrective disclosure.170 Where a corrective disclosure is bundled with other 
material information, however, this advantage is destroyed. As Professors 
Jill E. Fisch, Jonah B. Gelbach, and Jonathan Klick (Fisch et al.) note:  
When multiple sources of news are released at exactly the same 
time, however, no event study can by itself separate out the ef-
fects of the different news. The event study can only tell us 
whether the net effect of all the news was associated with an unu-
sually large drop or rise.171  
Although Fisch et al. state that “[t]he possibility of such strategic be-
havior raises important questions about the admissibility of non-event study 
evidence,”172 they do not go on to address those questions.  
When faced with multiple bundled disclosures, such that an event 
study cannot isolate the impact of the corrective disclosure, courts have two 
basic choices. First, they could simply dismiss any securities fraud claim. 
Whereas this would systematically under-deter fraud, it may nonetheless be 
justified by concerns over false positives and ease of administration.173 As 
argued above, however, this approach creates incentives for unfaithful man-
agers to engage in strategic bundling behavior. In order to avoid creating 
these incentives, the approach must turn on the defendant-managers’ behav-
ior. Where the bundling was unintentional or unavoidable, trading off deter-
rence for reliability and ease of administration is likely appropriate. 
                                                                                                                           
 170 See, e.g., Spindler, supra note 4, at 687 (“Recall that, with a single project, fraud is per-
fectly internalized under both ex post and ex ante [loss causation] rules, the difference being that 
the ex post approach also provides a ready measurement of damages.”). 
 171 Fisch et al., supra note 36, at 614. 
 172 Id. at 614–15. 
 173 See Spindler, supra note 4, at 688 (“Even taking into account the systemic underdeterrence 
of the ex post rule, one might think the ease of administration makes for a worthwhile tradeoff.”). 
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Where, however, plaintiffs are able to show that the bundling was in-
tentional and/or avoidable, a different approach is necessary, and a court 
should allow plaintiffs to introduce non-event study evidence. The plain-
tiff’s goal would remain the same: to value the fraudulent information. The 
first thing to note, however, is that this could be done in two ways. It could 
be done directly, by valuing the fraudulent information itself. Or, it could be 
done indirectly, by valuing the non-fraud-related information, and then sub-
tracting it from the market reaction to the bundled disclosures. In any given 
case, one or the other might be more susceptible to valuation by non-event 
study means. 
The form the non-market evidence could take would depend on the na-
ture of the corrective disclosure and the type of the bundled non-fraud-
related information. Fisch et al. give the example of earnings news, a com-
mon type of information bundled with a corrective disclosure. They note 
that “[e]xperts might be able to use historical price and earnings data for the 
firm to estimate the relationship between earnings news and the firm’s stock 
price.”174 They then suggest that:  
If th[e] study controlled appropriately for market expectations 
concerning the firm’s earnings (say, using analysts’ predictions), 
it might provide a plausible way to separate out the component of 
the event date’s estimated [abnormal] excess return that could 
reasonably be attributed to the earnings news, with the rest being 
due to the alleged corrective disclosure . . . .175  
If, on the other hand, the information concerns the success or failure of a 
particular project, an expert might attempt to value it using a classic DCF 
methodology, or by any other methodology generally accepted in the finan-
cial community. More crudely, an expert could attempt to assess the relative 
importance of multiple pieces of bundled information by measuring the rel-
ative frequencies with which news stories or headlines refer to them in the 
wake of the disclosures.176 
The allocation of the burden of proof can do useful work in this con-
text. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s approach 
in the Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household International, Inc. securities fraud 
2015 case is instructive.177 In Glickenhaus & Co., the plaintiffs argued at 
                                                                                                                           
 174 Fisch et al., supra note 36, at 614. 
 175 Id. 
 176 See id. (“Alternatively, experts might use quantitative content analysis, e.g., measuring the 
relative frequencies of two types of news in headlines of articles published following the news.”). 
See generally TABAK, supra note 96, at 13. 
 177 Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc., 787 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 2015). 
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trial that at least some of the price inflation due to the underlying fraud 
gradually “leaked out” as the market gradually learned the truth, as opposed 
to the price impact coming entirely from specific corrective disclosures.178 
The difficulty, of course, is that numerous non-fraud-related factors un-
doubtedly affected the stock price during the same period. On appeal, the 
defendants argued that the plaintiff’s “loss-causation model must itself ac-
count for, and perfectly exclude, any firm-specific, nonfraud related factors 
that may have contributed to the decline in a stock price.”179 Just as with 
bundled disclosures, however, the appeals court pointed out that “[i]t may 
be very difficult, if not impossible, for any statistical model to do this.”180 
As a result, the court required the plaintiffs to first explain “in noncon-
clusory terms” how its valuation methodology excluded non-fraud-related 
information.181 If they could do so, the burden would then shift to the de-
fendant to identify “some significant, firm-specific, nonfraud related infor-
mation that could have affected the stock price.”182 The burden would then 
shift back to the plaintiff to “account for that specific information or pro-
vide a loss-causation model that doesn’t suffer from the same problem.”183 
In a case of disclosure bundling, where the defendants themselves 
caused the problem of confounding information—or, at the very least, could 
have avoided it—some degree of burden shifting is even more appropriate. 
Where the plaintiffs can provide nonconclusory evidence that the corrective 
disclosure had a discernible market impact—or would have had a discerna-
ble market impact absent the bundled disclosure—the burden should shift to 
the defendant to account for the bundled information. If they are unable to 
do so, then, in the case of bundled negative information, the plaintiffs 
should benefit from a presumption that the entire abnormal price reaction 
was due to the corrective disclosure. In the case of bundled positive (con-
founding) information, the defendants should not be able to use the lack of 
market impact as a defense.  
B. Using (and Rejecting) Market Evidence in Merger Litigation Valuation 
The doctrinal lesson in merger litigation is at once more direct and 
more difficult for a judge to navigate. Any attempt to use unaffected market 
prices to measure the standalone value of a firm must reckon with infor-
                                                                                                                           
 178 See Report of Daniel R. Fischel at 24–25, Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int’l, Inc., 756 
F. Supp. 2d 928 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (No. 02-C-5893), 2007 WL 3192033. 
 179 Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 422. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id.  
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mation that was unavailable to the market prior to the announcement of the 
merger. Earnings or other material information bundled with the merger 
announcement—or deliberately released after the announcement—is only 
one particularly salient subset of such information. Where the plaintiff is 
able to show the existence of material information that was not available to 
the market, the court must either adjust the market price to take the infor-
mation into account or determine whether another valuation methodology 
would be more reliable. 
In its most recent pronouncement on appraisal litigation, the Delaware 
Supreme Court implicitly gave trial courts the discretion to do so. In its Ver-
ition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc. 2019 decision, the 
Delaware Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision to rely on the 
pre-announcement price as the sole evidence of fair value.184 In part, it re-
versed because the pre-announcement price did not reflect information that 
may have emerged between the announcement and the valuation date. In 
Delaware appraisal, the valuation is performed as of the date of the merger 
closing, which in Aruba was several months after the announcement of the 
merger agreement. 185 In addition, the court noted that the market lacked 
material information even as of the date of the announcement.186 Of particu-
lar relevance here, as noted above, the parties had bundled Aruba’s positive 
quarterly earnings with the merger announcement, a factor the Delaware 
Supreme Court suggested called into question the reliability of the pre-
announcement market price.187 The strong—and sensible—implication was 
that a court must either find a way to adjust the unaffected market price to 
reflect such information, or eschew reliance on the market price altogether. 
One remaining wrinkle is whether deliberately bundled or delayed in-
formation should be treated any differently than any other type of infor-
mation not available to the market pre-announcement. Arguably, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court implied that it should be in its opinion in Dell’s ap-
praisal case. In 2017, in Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master 
Fund Ltd., the court suggested that the market price was reliable because 
the trial court had “found no evidence that information failed to flow freely 
                                                                                                                           
 184 See Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128, 130, 132 
(Del. 2019) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’g C.A. No. 11448, 2018 WL 922139 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 
2018). 
 185 Id. at 139 (“For starters, the unaffected market price was a measurement from three to four 
months prior to the valuation date, a time period during which it is possible for new, material 
information relevant to a company’s future earnings to emerge.”). 
 186 See id. (“Even more important, HP . . . also had material, nonpublic information that, by 
definition, could not have been baked into the public trading price.”). 
 187 Id. (noting that “HP knew about Aruba’s strong quarterly earnings before the market did, 
and likely took that information into account when pricing the deal”). 
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or that management purposefully tempered investors’ expectations for the 
[c]ompany so that it could eventually take over the [c]ompany at a fire-sale 
price.”188 The implication is that management’s deliberate withholding of 
information should be taken as especially strong evidence that the market 
price is not reliable. 
The trial court in Aruba found surprising the apparent significance that 
the Dell court placed on management’s intent.189 Yet, the emphasis on man-
agerial intent may be appropriate for two reasons. First, one purpose of the 
merger class action and the appraisal remedy—perhaps the primary pur-
pose—is to deter managerial opportunism in the merger context.190 Strategic 
disclosure practices such as those catalogued above are themselves a spe-
cies of destructive managerial opportunism that should be deterred. Second, 
managerial intent can serve as a red flag: powerful circumstantial evidence 
that management—who have a considerable informational advantage over 
the court—believed that the withheld information was material and would 
undermine their argument that the market price (or even the merger price) 
was fair. Thus, bundling or delaying of material disclosures should trigger a 
presumption that the market price is not a reliable indicator of fair value. 
Furthermore, where the deal price was itself anchored on the merger price, 
strategic disclosure practices call into question the fairness of the deal price 
as well.191 
CONCLUSION 
It is natural for courts to want to defer to market evidence of valuation. 
In most cases, they are right to do so. Market prices represent a consensus 
generated by the buying and selling decisions of thousands of market partic-
                                                                                                                           
 188 Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 25–26 (Del. 
2017). 
 189 See Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., C.A. No. 11448, 2018 
WL 922139, at *34 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018) (“My prediction of the law before the Delaware Su-
preme Court’s decision in Dell would have been that scienter did not matter for an appraisal case 
where the sole litigable question is valuation rather than culpability.”), rev’d, 210 A.3d 128 (Del. 
2019) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 190 See generally Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, Reforming Modern Appraisal Litigation, 
41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 279, 282 (2017) (noting that “[a]ppraisal now stands as a formidable mecha-
nism of deterrence to opportunistic mergers”). 
 191 In 2019, in In re Appraisal of Columbia Pipeline Group, the Delaware Court of Chancery 
recognized the possibility that “the reliability of the trading price” may reflect on the reliability of 
the negotiated “deal price.” See In re Appraisal of Columbia Pipeline Grp., C.A. No. 12736, 2019 
WL 3778370, at *49 (Del. Ch. Aug. 12, 2019) (“Based on these authorities, this decision does not 
have to make a finding regarding the reliability of the trading price as a condition to relying on the 
deal price. It remains conceivable that there could be a case where the parties anchored deal nego-
tiations off the trading price, but this is not that case.”). 
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ipants competing to identify any information relevant to the value of a secu-
rity. In most circumstances, courts are correct to conclude that this price-
forming process will generate a more reliable estimate of value than a judge 
struggling to reconcile the testimony of competing experts in an adversarial 
trial. 
Market pricing, however, is only as good as the information available 
to the market. Courts must be cognizant of the information asymmetry be-
tween managers and the market. Furthermore, managers at least partly con-
trol the flow of information to the market. Where courts rely on market 
prices, managers can use this control strategically to gain an advantage in 
litigation. Where they are successful, the deterrence value of litigation is 
weakened. In particular, managers can—and do—use their ability to bundle 
or delay disclosure of material information to undermine the deterrence val-
ue of securities fraud and merger litigation. 
To combat this possibility, the SEC should require that certain types of 
litigation-relevant information be disclosed to the market in as informative a 
form as possible—unbundled and before the price reaction is distorted by a 
pending merger. In addition, courts should be cautious to avoid creating 
incentives for strategic disclosure behavior. Where strategic disclosure be-
havior is possible, courts must preserve the flexibility to resort to non-
market valuation evidence. Where it appears strategic disclosure behavior 
may have occurred, courts should not hesitate to use this flexibility. In sum, 
if courts are to defer to market valuation evidence, they must ensure that the 
market has received the relevant information in a fashion that makes market 
valuation evidence reliable. 
 
 
 
